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IN SEARCH OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: 
DOES LIHPRHA RESTRICT STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM 
PRESERVING AFFORDABLE HOUSING? 
Michael Freedman∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past twenty-five years, the federal government has 
reduced its role in maintaining the nation’s affordable housing 
supply,1 shifting the burden of housing America’s poor to state and 
local governments.2 From the New-Deal era through the 1970s, the 
                                                          
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.A., University of California, Los 
Angeles, 2000. The author would like to thank his family and friends from 
coast-to-coast for their love, encouragement and unyielding support. Special 
thanks to Professor David Reiss for his guidance and insight. Many thanks to the 
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their assistance and patience. 
1 Affordable housing refers to housing intended for “low-income” or “very 
low-income” people. Families with incomes less than eighty percent of the area 
median income are considered “low-income.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(b)(2) (2002). 
Families with incomes less than fifty percent of the area median income are 
considered “very low-income.” Id. 
2 Roger K. Lewis, Free-Market Housing Programs Come Up Short as 
Affordability Gap Widens With Age; Shaping the City, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 
1999, at G10; Wayne Washington, White House Starts Shift of Housing Burden 
to States HUD Spokesmen Cite Delays in Using U.S. Aid, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
14, 2003, at A3; Glenn Thrush & Graham Rayman, Housing Sees Cuts in 
Budget; Bush Administration Proposals Would Mean as Much as $200M Less 
for Low-Income Vouchers, Subsidies, NEWSDAY (New York), Feb. 9, 2005, at 
A07; Tim May, Low-Income Rentals Threatened as Vote Looms in U.S. Senate; 
Housing: Affordability Rents and Efforts by Tenants to Own Their Buildings 
May Hinge on Fate of Some Federal Subsidies. Los Angeles Could Be Hit 
Particularly Hard, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B1; David W. Chen, HUD Aid 
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federal government played a major role in providing affordable 
housing to the nation’s poor and low-income communities through 
the creation of large, project-based subsidy programs that provided 
incentives to owners to build and maintain affordable housing 
projects.3 During the 1960s and 1970s, more than two million units 
were built under project-based programs.4 Starting with the Reagan 
Administration, however, federal housing policies began to reflect 
a preference for letting the market address housing demands by 
providing subsidies directly to tenants through housing vouchers, 
while preserving and rehabilitating the existing stock of affordable 
projects.5 Housing policies shifted further throughout the Clinton 
Administration, during which the federal government eliminated 
funding for the development of affordable housing projects and for 
preservation incentives.6 The current administration is attempting 
                                                          
Short by $50 Million, City Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at B5; Hillary 
Stout, Housing Subsidies in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1988, at sec. 8, 1; Ann 
Mariano, Housing Policy Faces New Challenges; Low-Income Programs Seen 
Threatened, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1985, at G1 (“Five years ago, housing the 
poor was high on the list of national priorities, the fastest-growing federal 
subsidy program of the decade. . . . But little more than a year ago, with the 
election of Ronald Reagan, all that began to change.”). 
3 Alfred M. Clark, III, Can America Afford to Abandon a National Housing 
Policy?, 6 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 185, 185 (1997) (citing the 
Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (repealed 1990)); see also Peter 
Salinas, Toward a Permanent Housing Problem, No. 95 Public Interest 22-23 
(1986), reprinted in CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 14 (3d ed. 1999). Under these programs, private owners 
contracted with the federal government to receive subsidies in return for keeping 
rents affordable for low-income income tenants. Id. The term “project” is 
sometimes used in reference to government owned and operated public housing. 
“Project” in this note generically refers to any affordable housing development. 
 In addition to federal housing efforts, virtually every state and most larger 
cities have agencies dedicated to the housing the poor. Id. State and local efforts 
act as both conduits for federal assistance and supplement local efforts. Id. 
4 Clark, supra note 3, at 187. 
5 Michael Grunwald, Further Cuts Feared in Housing for the Poor; 
Menino Says City Needs Game Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1995, at 1 (“The 
federal government has not built much affordable housing since 1980, but it has 
left intact and often rehabilitated the existing stock.”); see also Mariano, supra 
note 2. 
6 HUD’s Flawed Blueprint, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1995, at 10; Grunwald, 
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to completely sever any ties between the federal government and 
low-income tenants by providing housing funds directly to state 
governments through block grants, along with the responsibility 
for administering federal housing programs.7 
The transfer to the states of responsibility for the creation and 
maintenance of affordable housing has occurred largely with 
Congress’s consent.8 State and local governments, however, are 
                                                          
supra note 5 (“Clinton’s plan to overhaul HUD to free cities and states from its 
oversight and to increase choice for low-income tenants could chip away at that 
stock, HUD officials conceded.”) (quoting Sue Marsh, executive director of the 
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless). 
7 Thrush & Rayman, supra note 2; Steve Twedt, The Fraying Safety Net, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Pennsylvania), Mar. 27, 2005, at A10; Ron 
Nissimov, City Moving Quickly to Spend Block Grant Money; Funds Not Used 
by May 1 Are at Risk of Being Lost, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 25, 2005, at B5; 
Jocelyn Y. Stewart, U.S. Blamed in Cuts to Rental Aid for Poor; Changes to 
Housing Program Will Lead to Higher Costs, Canceled Contracts, Critics Say, 
L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at B1. Unfortunately, federal funding of block grants 
for housing falls short of the amount promised to participants in current voucher 
programs and is insufficient to maintain the programs’ effectiveness. David W. 
Chen, U.S. Is Asked to Increase Housing Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at B1 
(“New York City officials say their projected share of federal funds for low-
income housing vouchers is more than $61 million short of what is needed . . . . 
In all, 492 out of an estimated 2,500 housing agencies that issue vouchers have 
asked for more money.”). 
8 See Paulette J. Williams, Special Series: Developing Sustainable Urban 
Communities: The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues 
Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 455 (2004). 
The story of affordable housing development during the 1980s is a 
story of disinvestment by the federal government, devolution of the 
responsibility for housing upon state and local government, and an 
increasing sense that the private enterprise with government subsidies 
could do a better job of addressing the continuing crisis than 
government did at any level. 
Id.; Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: 
The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 907-16 (1990) 
(advocating a market-based approach to the availability of public housing based 
on the availability of maximal tenant choice and the use of vouchers to obtain 
private housing). 
 The federal government has abandoned commitments in a variety of social 
welfare contexts, creating new challenges for state and local governments, and 
also new opportunities for the private market, primarily non-for-profit 
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not prepared, nor are they able, to take over where the federal 
government left off. Budgetary challenges limit the ability of state 
and local governments to develop new affordable housing projects 
and force states to turn to their most controversial housing 
regulations, including rent control and eminent domain, to preserve 
a small but important stock of permanent affordable housing.9 
                                                          
organizations. See generally John J. Ammann & Peter W. Salsich, Jr., 
Symposium: Nonprofit Housing Providers: Can They Survive the “Devolution 
Revolution”?, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 321 (1997) (discussing a widening 
role for nonprofits in the development of affordable housing policy). 
The “devolution revolution,” as exemplified by the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation, has created major uncertainties for housing and 
homeless services providers. How the states will respond to new 
responsibilities that are accompanied by fewer resources is a matter of 
conjecture at the moment. As welfare reform begins to be implemented, 
it is increasingly clear that it will have major impact on housing policy. 
Low-income families may be able to accept “a new social contract that 
expects and rewards work and responsible behavior” in return for help 
in finding jobs, protecting children and escaping poverty. 
Id. at 352. 
9 David W. Chen, Bill on Affordable Housing Sets Up Sides for a Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at B5. See generally William A. Fishel & Perry 
Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic 
Interpretations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988), 
reprinted in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 
514 (2d ed. 1995). 
 State and local governments have used alternative means of developing 
efficient, low-cost solutions to the growing affordable housing crisis. New York 
City’s Tenant Empowerment Act: Hearing on Intro. No. 186 and Proposed Res. 
No. 388-A Before the Committee on Housing and Buildings of the Council of the 
City of New York (Oct. 28, 2004) (statement of James Grow, Esq., National 
Housing Law Project) [hereinafter Grow]. These measures seek to reinstitute the 
key “component of the federal preservation policy for HUD-subsidized 
properties that the federal government abandoned since 1995—that preservation 
is of sufficient importance to warrant restrictions on owner conversion, so long 
as those restrictions are supported with market-value compensation.” Id. at 6. 
 While the over the direction of American housing policy continues, this 
note assumes that, at the present time, the free-market is unable solve the 
immediate needs of the nearly two million families that will be forced to 
relocate if current privately-owned subsidized affordable housing projects 
remove affordability restrictions. See, e.g., Peter Dreier, The New Politics of 
Housing, 63 J. OF THE AM. PLANNING ASS’N 5 (1997), reprinted in DAYE, supra 
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Further, in their efforts to maintain the rapidly diminishing 
affordable housing stock, state and local legislatures have 
encountered difficulty in determining the scope of their authority 
with respect to housing, given the uncertain application of a single 
provision within a much larger federal statute—the Low Income 
Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 1990 
(LIHPRHA or the Preservation Act).10 
Programs for privately owned, federally subsidized housing 
projects, under forty-year subsidized mortgages, originally 
permitted developers to free themselves of affordability restrictions 
after twenty years.11 LIHPRHA set forth a number of federal 
preservation policies intended to protect low-income tenants from 
profit-motivated owners seeking to convert their federally 
subsidized housing projects to market-rate units.12 The 
Preservation Act and its predecessor, the Emergency Low-Income 
Housing Preservation Act of 1987,13 created a burdensome process 
for converting federal affordable housing projects to market-rate 
units (“opting out”), including a requirement that owners provide 
findings that low-income tenants would not be adversely impacted 
by the conversion of the regulated properties.14 This high threshold 
                                                          
note 3, at 7; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 480 (4th ed. 
1992).  
10 Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 
1990, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4125 (1996) [hereinafter LIHPRHA]. See also New 
York City’s Tenant Empowerment Act: Hearing on Intro. No. 186 and Proposed 
Res. No. 388-A Before the Committee on Housing and Buildings of the Council 
of the City of New York (Oct. 28, 2004) (statement of Prof. Paula Franzese, Esq., 
Seton Hall School of Law) (examining federal preemption of a proposed New 
York City preservation law) [hereinafter Franzese] (on file with author).  
11 See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4125. David Etezadi & Peter Manzo, LIHPRHA: 
Great Opportunity for Community Control, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. 
DEV. L. 67 (1994-1995). 
13 Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. § 
1715l (1989 & Supp. 1995). 
14 See LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101, 4102(a), 4107, 4108. Under 
LIHPRHA’s prepayment procedures, an owner first had to file with HUD, 
tenants, and others a “notice of intent” to prepay. Id. § 4102(a). The owner then 
was required to submit a plan of action (POA) setting forth information relating 
to the proposed prepayment. Id. § 4107. HUD would then evaluate the owner’s 
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essentially prohibited owners from prepaying forty-year mortgages 
and from opting out of their respective federal housing programs 
after the twenty years.15 Owners were protected under LIHPRHA, 
however, from additional burdens imposed by state or local 
governments through a preemption provision that prohibited states 
from further restricting the prepayment of mortgages subsidized by 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).16 This provision is codified in section 4122 of Title 12 of 
the United States Code (Section 4122). 
Facing budget concerns, Congress began to remove the 
preservation restrictions in 1996 through various appropriations 
acts. The first of these, the Housing Opportunity Program 
Extension Act (HOPE),17 provided owners seeking to opt out an 
alternative to LIHPRHA.18 Under HOPE, owners were able to opt 
out of federal housing programs without HUD’s consent so long as 
they agreed to not increase rents for sixty days.19 The question 
remained, however, whether LIHPRHA’s preemption provision 
would protect buildings opting out under HOPE’s terms from state 
or local preservation initiatives. HOPE contains no preemption 
provision, nor does it refer to LIHPRHA’s preemption provision.20 
Indeed, there is no language in either of the respective statutes 
                                                          
POA for approval. Id. § 4101(a). Under the Act, HUD could issue such approval 
for prepayment only after making certain written findings that the prepayment 
would not adversely affect the low-income housing supply or involuntarily 
displace current tenants. Id. §§ 4101(a), 4108. 
15 Arthur R. Hessel & Susan Sturman, Heard From HUD: LIHPRHA 
Comes Full Circle, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 316, 318 (1996). 
16 12 U.S.C. § 4122. 
17 Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
120, § 2(b), 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 4101 note (1996)) 
[hereinafter HOPE]. 
18 See Kenneth Arms Tenant Ass’n v. Martinez, No. CIV. S-01-832, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *13 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“The Housing Opportunity 
Program Extension Act of 1996 . . . permitted mortgage prepayment without 
HUD’s approval.”). 
19 See infra note 74. 
20 Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 11470, at *26 (holding that HOPE 
does not contain a preemption provision and when owners are involved with the 
HOPE prepayment scheme, LIHPRHA’s preemption provision does not apply). 
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directly discussing the relationship between and interplay of HOPE 
and LIHPRHA. 
Two recent cases considering the applicability of LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision to HOPE’s prepayment provisions 
demonstrate the confusion surrounding this issue. The Eighth 
Circuit, in Forest Park II v. Hadley,21 and the Ninth Circuit, in 
Topa Equities v. City of Los Angeles,22 examined two principal 
questions: (1) whether the LIHPRHA preemption provision applies 
to buildings opting out under HOPE’s prepayment schedule; and 
(2) whether the LIHPRHA provision preempts the respective 
Minnesota and California preservation statute challenged in the 
cases.23 Both courts agreed that, despite the defunding of 
LIHPRHA, the Act’s preemption provision is applicable to 
HOPE’s prepayment schedule because of the plain meaning of 
LIHPRHA’s preemption provision and the state laws’ apparent 
effect of regulating HUD.24 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits reached 
conflicting holdings with respect to the second issue.25 The Eighth 
Circuit employed a “practical effects” analysis, under which all 
state or local preservation laws that have the effect of limiting or 
delaying owners’ expectations of converting their affordable 
housing projects to market rates are preempted.26 By contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit employed a “legal consequences” test, under which 
laws that “restrict or inhibit” the prepayment of federally 
subsidized mortgages are preempted.27 The result is that state or 
local laws (e.g., rent control regulations) in the Eighth Circuit that 
restrict owners from realizing the potential gains from market-rate 
rents following opt out are preempted, while those in the Ninth 
Circuit, according to the court in Topa Equities, are not. 
                                                          
21 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g 
en banc denied (2003). 
22 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
23 Id. at 1067; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 727. 
24 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732. 
25 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 733. See also 
Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 704 (2004). 
26 Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 733. 
27 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070. 
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The courts’ holdings in Forest Park and Topa Equities will 
have direct consequences for whether current programs, which 
increasingly are being administered by states, can continue to meet 
“the critical and growing needs of lower-income Americans for 
decent and affordable housing.”28 Nationwide, more than four and 
a half million seniors, people with disabilities, and families with 
low incomes live in federally subsidized affordable housing rental 
units.29 
In examining the application of LIHPRHA’s preemption 
provision to buildings opting out under HOPE and other alternative 
prepayment provisions, this note argues that the circuit courts 
incorrectly adopted a plain meaning approach to the interpretation 
of LIHPRHA’s preemption provision. In this case, preemption 
jurisprudence dictates that ambiguous statutory language should be 
interpreted in light of the relevant legislative history and the 
underlying purpose and structure of the statutes. Indeed, a review 
of the legislative purpose and history of LIHPRHA and the past 
practice of HUD lead to the conclusion that LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision should not apply to buildings opting out 
under HOPE. 
Part I of this note examines the background of federal policies 
regarding the development and preservation of affordable housing 
projects. Part II discusses current state and local affordable housing 
preservation policies. Part III examines Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding constitutional preemption standards. Part 
IV analyzes the holdings of Forest Park30 and Topa Equities.31 
Part V.A examines the debate about whether LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision should be applied to alternative prepayment 
processes such as HOPE. This part highlights the circuit courts’ 
                                                          
28 Grow, supra note 9, at 3. These units represent more than one-third of 
our country’s subsidized housing inventory. Id. 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., RENTAL HOUSING DYNAMICS: IS 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR THE POOR AND ENDANGERED SPECIES? (2003), 
available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/ahs/ahsReports.html#2. U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., THE WIDENING GAP: NEW FINDINGS ON HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY IN AMERICA (1997). 
30 Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 733. 
31 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070. 
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reliance on a plain meaning approach to the interpretation of the 
LIHPRHA preemption provision, as compared to the broad 
approach suggested by affordable housing advocates, who argue 
that the interpretation of LIHPRHA requires the use of a range of 
sources, including legislative history, and agency policy and 
practice. Part V.B proposes that if courts continue to apply the 
LIHPRHA preemption provision to HOPE or other prepayment 
statutes, then constitutional preemption jurisprudence and 
congressional history support the use of the Ninth Circuit’s legal 
consequences test rather than the Eighth Circuit’s practical effects 
approach. Part VI recommends that state and local governments 
interested in preserving their privately owned, federally subsidized 
affordable housing should enact preservation laws that enable and 
aid the transfer of such properties to non-speculative preservation 
owners following the current owners’ opting-out of federal 
affordable housing programs. 
I. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRESERVATION POLICIES 
Since 1949, the priority of U.S. housing policy has been to 
achieve “a decent home and suitable living environment for every 
American family.”32 The National Housing Act of 194933 
employed an approach that was unique among New Deal-era 
policies in enticing private industry to aid the implementation of a 
government initiative.34 Through below-market interest rate loans 
                                                          
32 Salinas, supra note 3, at 22-23. In pursuit of the objectives of the 
Housing Act of 1949, the national government subsidized construction of 1.2 
million new low-income apartments, 800,000 new apartments for moderate-
income families, and 700,000 new apartments for the elderly. Id. Adding more 
than 1.5 million rent supplements per year and other subsidy programs, the 
federal government has subsidized more than 5 million households with new or 
rehabilitated housing units since 1950. Id. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949) [hereinafter National Housing Act of 1949].  
34 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Will the “Free Market” Solve the Affordable 
Housing Crisis?, J. OF POVERTY L. AND POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 573 
(explaining how the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, which created the federal public 
housing program, created programs designed to construct and manage housing 
projects in order to provide homes but also in major part to help the country 
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and general subsidies, federal housing programs provided 
incentives to private developers to build inexpensive housing.35 
In 1961, Congress enacted a below-market interest rate 
program (Section 221(d)(3)),36 which was later replaced in 1968 by 
an interest subsidy program (Section 236).37 Under Section 
221(d)(3) and Section 236, HUD was authorized to insure loans 
made by private lending institutions and to subsidize interest 
payments on loans extended to profit-motivated developers.38 
Through subsidies, HUD reduced the interest rates of private 
market mortgages (usually about eight to ten percent) to between 
one and three percent, and offered developers the option of 
extending mortgage loans for the construction period plus forty 
years.39 Owners were expected to share the benefits of the program 
with tenants through lower rents.40 
In exchange for favorable financing terms, owners of Section 
221(d)(3) and 236 housing projects were required to comply with 
certain minimum property standards and to maintain the housing 
for occupancy by low-income families.41 Mortgage documents for 
projects under these sections prohibited project owners from 
prepaying their forty-year mortgages for a period of twenty years 
without HUD’s prior consent.42 This restriction prevented owners 
                                                          
come out of the Great Depression by creating new construction jobs); Angela D. 
Chatman, Housing Cuts; Restructuring HUD Will Shred the Safety Net for the 
Poor. But the Pain Will Be Shared by All, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), 
Mar. 26, 1995, at 1C. 
35 Salsich, supra note 34, at 576. 
36 National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1961). 
37 Id. § 1715z-1 (1968). 
38 Sheldon Winkelman, Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident 
Homeownership Act of 1990, 73 MICH. B.J. 1160, 1160 (1994). 
39 Id. 
40 See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Sherman Park Apartments v. United States, 528 
U.S. 820 (1999).  
41 Winkelman, supra note 38, at 1160. 
42 Cienega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1234-35. 
 Generally, when obtaining a HUD-insured mortgage under either of 
the above programs, an owner executed a deed of trust note payable to 
a private lending institution. The note evidenced a loan made to the 
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from escaping the low-income housing limitations and use 
restrictions during this period.43 
Despite the government’s efforts to generate and maintain 
affordable housing through the Section 221(d)(3), Section 236, and 
Section 8 project-based programs, America’s affordable housing 
needs remained substantially unmet.44 Many of the projects built 
                                                          
owner pursuant to a loan agreement between the owner and the lending 
institution that contemplated advances to the owner. Payment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by the note was secured by a deed of trust, or a 
mortgage, on the subject property. The note and deed of trust were 
printed on forms approved by HUD, and HUD endorsed the note as 
part of its mortgage insurance. The repayment term of the loan was 
generally forty years. Simultaneously, in exchange for HUD’s 
endorsement for insurance (pursuant to a commitment for insurance), 
the owner entered into a regulatory agreement with HUD, under which 
the owner agreed, among other things, to certain “affordability 
restrictions,” including restrictions on the income levels of tenants, 
restrictions on allowable rental rates, and restrictions on the rate of 
return the owner could receive from the housing project. The regulatory 
agreement and the mortgage insurance provided by HUD were to 
remain in effect so long as the loan remained outstanding. 
 While the regulatory agreement made no mention of the right to 
prepay the outstanding loan, a rider to the deed of trust note permitted 
the owner to prepay the loan in full, without HUD approval, after 
twenty years. Developers could not prepay their loans prior to twenty 
years, except under certain conditions, including HUD approval. The 
prepayment rules in the riders reflected contemporaneous HUD 
regulations governing the Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 programs. 
By prepaying the outstanding loan, an owner could terminate HUD’s 
affordability restrictions on the property. The owner then could convert 
the property into a conventional rental property and charge market 
rental rates, thereby obtaining a greater return on the investment. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
43 Id. at 1235. 
44 Grow, supra note 9, at 2. Throughout the 1970s, projects under Sections 
221(d)(3) and 236 suffered large operating losses, as rents remained static 
despite increasing maintenance costs. Id. In response, Congress supplied 
additional subsidies in the form of Section 8 Loan Management Set-Aside 
contracts, commonly known as Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) 
contracts. See Henry A. Herrman, Comment, Privity: How HUD Avoided 
Contract Liability under ELIHPA and LIHPRHA, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 329 
(2001). Section 8 subsidies originally provided direct payments to owners of 
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under these programs quickly fell into disrepair due to the projects’ 
failure to generate sufficient “revenue to keep pace with rising 
operating, management, and maintenance costs.”45 Attempting to 
address the deficiencies of its project-based tenant subsidy 
programs, Congress subsequently developed a tenant-based 
Section 8 voucher program that largely replaced project-based 
subsidy programs.46 As a result, appropriations under Sections 
221(d)(3) and 236 stopped.47 However, the approximately 800,000 
units built under these programs continued in operation pursuant to 
the twenty-year prepayment restriction.48 
In the mid-1980s, more than 800,000 units built under Sections 
221(d)(3) and 236 were still held under federal rent prohibitions 
and remained an important part of the nation’s affordable housing 
stock. Congress became concerned that a significant portion of this 
pool could be lost through conversion to market-rate units because 
the twenty-year restriction on prepayment for most of the 
properties would soon expire.49 Upon prepayment, “the units 
would no longer be restricted to low-income occupancy.”50 
Because in most cases local rents for comparable properties 
exceeded the rents earned by assisted housing units, the owners of 
these units could increase their profits by converting properties to 
market-rate rents or condominium status.51 Conversions of both 
types threatened the same result—the removal from the market of 
affordable housing for low-income tenants. 
                                                          
section 236 projects to supplement the rent payable by low-income tenants and 
to offset operating costs for the projects. Clark, supra note 3, at 187-88. 
45 Herrman, supra note 44, at 329. 
46 Id. at 187-88. For a discussion of section 8 subsidies, see DAYE, supra 
note 3, at 210-20; see also Brian Maney & Sheila Cowley, Scarcity and Success: 
Perspectives on Assisted Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 
319 (2000). 
47 Clark, supra note 3, at 187. 
48 Id. 
49 C. Theodore Koebel & Cara L. Bailey, State Policies and Program to 
Preserve Federally Assisted Low-Income Housing, 3 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE, 
995, 995-96 (1990) (citing John Moore, Expiring Uses, NAT’L J., Aug. 2, 1986, 
at 1184-88).  
50 Id. 
51 Id. See also Grow, supra note 9, at 4. 
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The prospect that nearly one million units of low-income 
housing built during the 1960s would soon become eligible to be 
released from rent restrictions prompted Congress to enact the 
Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 
(Emergency Act).52 The Emergency Act prohibited owners of 
projects eligible for prepayment from converting these properties 
to market-rate units unless they first complied with cumbersome 
provisions.53 The Emergency Act effectively placed a moratorium 
on prepayment by owners of their Section 221(d)(3) and 236 
housing development loans at the end of the original twenty-year 
period.54 Owners, outraged at the sudden abrogation of their 
contractual rights, filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality 
of the Emergency Act.55 
                                                          
52 Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. § 
1715l (1989 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter ELIHPA]. See also Johnson v. United 
States Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 911 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(citing H.R.CONF.REP. No. 426, 100th Cong., reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 3458, 3489-3790). 
The Preservation Act was prompted by the prospect that nearly one 
million units of low income housing built in the 1960s would soon be 
eligible to be released from rent restrictions because of the expiration of 
the twenty-year moratorium on unilateral mortgage prepayment and the 
expiration of Section 8 rental assistance contracts. To prevent a national 
crisis in the availability of low income housing, Congress passed a 
temporary measure making it more difficult for owners of § 221(d)(3) 
housing to release themselves from the terms of the regulatory 
agreement. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
53 Koebel & Bailey, supra note 49, at 996. 
54 Winkelman, supra note 38, 1160. See also Clark, supra note 3, at 189 
(explaining that Congress passed ELIHPA as emergency legislation, intending 
government and private industry to work together in developing permanent 
solutions to the impending disaster of losing nearly 800,000 affordable housing 
units). 
55 ELIHPA was controversial because many owners believed that the terms 
of the Act breached the federal government’s agreement to free the owners from 
rent and land use restrictions. Howard Cohen & Taylor Mattis, Prepayment 
Rights: Abrogation by the Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident 
Homeownership Act of 1990, 28 REAL PROP. & TR. J. 1 (1993).  Under federal 
project-based subsidy programs of the National Housing Act, the private 
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While these suits were pending, Congress repealed the 
Emergency Act and enacted the National Affordable Housing Act, 
including the Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident 
Homeownership Act of 1990 (LIHPRHA or Preservation Act).56 
LIHPRHA established a comprehensive program to recapitalize 
privately-owned assisted housing and to commit these properties 
for use as low-income housing for their “remaining useful life” of 
fifty years.57 To effectuate this goal, LIHPRHA encouraged 
owners to refinance their units under the program58 or to sell their 
                                                          
developer secured a loan from a private lender, evidenced by a deed of trust note 
payable to a private lending institution (the “Note”). Cienega Gardens v. United 
States, 33 Fed. Cl. 196, 196-203 (1995). HUD endorsed the Note as part of its 
process of insuring the mortgage. Id. The Note contained a rider, which 
expressly permitted the owner to prepay the loan in full, without HUD approval, 
after twenty years. Cienega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1235. The rider was the only 
document that expressly mentioned the borrower’s right to prepay. Id. Pursuant 
to the rider, developers were not permitted to prepay their HUD-insured loans 
prior to twenty years except under certain conditions. Id. Owners argued that 
Congress had interfered with their contractual right of prepayment. See 
Herrman, supra note 44, at 330 n.66 (citing Orrego v. 833 W. Buena Joint 
Ventura, 943 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding ELIHPA not retroactive without 
reaching the constitutional question); Thetford Properties v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 907 F.2d 445, 450 (4th Cir. 1990) (dismissing appellant’s 
constitutional claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Johnson v. 
U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 911 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1990) (dismissing 
plaintiffs’ claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Orrego v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 701 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). 
56 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4147. LIHPRHA was part of a more 
comprehensive housing law called the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12701-12898 (1996). See generally Winkelman, 
supra note 38, at 1161. 
57 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4112(c). “[T]he term ‘remaining useful life’ 
means. . . the period during which the physical characteristics of the housing 
remain in a condition suitable for occupancy, assuming normal maintenance and 
repairs are made and major systems and capital components are replaced as 
becomes necessary.” Id. Fifty years after the commencement of the POA, the 
owner may petition HUD for a hearing to determine whether the useful life of 
the project has expired. Id.  
58 Koebel & Bailey, supra note 49, at 997 (“LIHPRHA preservation 
incentives include insured or direct capital improvement financing, an equity 
takeout loan, an 8 percent return on preservation equity, access to reserves, 
increased Section 8 and non-Section 8 rents, and insured acquisition loans and 
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properties to “qualified purchasers.”59 With the hope of attracting 
willing owners, LIHPRHA offered a range of incentives, including 
increased rent ceilings, increased allowable rates of return on 
investments, and equity loan funds for capital improvements.60 
LIHPRHA specifically addressed the contested contractual 
issues raised by the Emergency Act by permitting owners to 
prepay their mortgage loans; however, the Act discouraged the 
widespread exercise of this option through the creation of a 
burdensome approval process.61 Under the Act’s prepayment 
procedures, an owner first had to file with HUD, tenants, and 
others a “notice of intent” to prepay.62 The owner then was 
required to submit a “plan of action” (POA) setting forth 
information relating to the proposed prepayment.63 HUD would 
then evaluate the owner’s POA for approval.64 Under the 
Preservation Act, HUD could issue approval for prepayment only 
after making certain written findings that the prepayment would 
not adversely affect the low-income housing supply or 
involuntarily displace current tenants.65 In the event that HUD 
could not make the necessary findings, LIHPRHA required that the 
agency disapprove the owner’s POA and deny the owner’s request 
for prepayment approval.66 
                                                          
grants to qualified purchasers.”). 
59 Id. 
“Qualified purchaser” is a technical term in the act identifying either a 
priority purchaser as previously defined or another purchaser 
committing to continuation of the units as assisted housing. Priority 
purchasers include a local or state government agency, a nonprofit 
housing corporation, or a tenant organization. For-profit buyers are 
eligible as qualified purchasers if they are willing to commit to the use 
restriction. 
Id. 
60 Cienega Gardens, 194 F.3d at 1235. 
61 See LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4147. 
62 Id. § 4102(a). 
63 Id. § 4107. 
64 Id. § 4101(a). 
65 Id. §§ 4101(a), 4108. See also Forest Park, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
66 Id. § 4108(c). Under LIHPRHA’s stringent procedures, the prepayment 
option was effectively limited to situations in which (1) there was no bona fide 
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Under the market conditions of the mid-1990s, few owners 
could reasonably satisfy the Preservation Act’s requirements for 
prepayment.67 Further, the properties of many owners were 
insufficiently valuable to qualify for additional financial incentives 
under the Act. Therefore, most “eligible” owners did not to 
participate in LIHPRHA at all.68 Of the owners that did participate, 
virtually all filed POAs seeking preservation incentives to remain 
in the affordable housing program.69 
While Congress intended to burden owners with additional 
federal restrictions through the Preservation Act, it also sought to 
protect them from additional burdens imposed by state or local 
governments. Section 4122 of LIHPRHA expressly preempted 
state and local governments from establishing or enforcing laws or 
regulations that would “restrict or prohibit” the prepayment of 
loans on LIHPRHA-eligible housing projects.70 By its terms, 
                                                          
purchaser for the owner’s property, (2) there was insufficient public funding to 
implement preservation, or (3) the owner’s POA was supported by sufficient 
negative impact findings by HUD. Winkelman, supra note 38, at 1161-62. 
An owner who wishes to prepay must file a notice of intent to do so, 
simultaneously with HUD as well as with the appropriate state or local 
government officer, the holder of the existing mortgage and the tenants. 
HUD’s permission to prepay is only granted if the project fits into one 
of two categories, namely: The project must be located in an area where 
there is no need for low-income housing and where there will be no 
substantial economic effect on the tenants; or the project must have a 
value so high that the amount of federal incentives which must be 
offered (“Federal Cost Limits”) cannot support the appraised value of 
the property. It is generally felt that it would require an extremely 
unique set of facts and circumstances to lead to HUD’s granting 
permission for prepayment; that is, all areas arguably need low-income 
housing and very few projects have a value greater than the Federal 
Cost Limits. Therefore, the option of prepayment is probably a fiction. 
Id. 
67 Winkelman, supra note 38 (citing Thetford Properties, 907 F.2d at 450) 
(“[T]he option of prepayment is probably a fiction . . . .”). 
68 Id. See also Grow, supra note 9, at 3. 
69 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4109. 
70 Id. § 4122. In relevant part, the statute reads: 
(a) In general. No State or political subdivision of a State may 
establish, continue in effect, or enforce any law or regulation that . . . 
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Section 4122 did not apply to local laws of general applicability.71 
The Preservation Act, along with its express preemption provision, 
ensured affordable housing for the most at-risk low-income 
Americans, while providing equitable treatment of federally 
funded incentives among the states. 72 
In the late 1990s, an emerging interest in balancing the national 
budget, coupled with HUD’s promotion of its “Reinvention 
Blueprint”—a radical proposal to substitute vouchers for all 
project-based assistance—led to Congress’s defunding of the 
Preservation Act and the creation of a series of new programs to 
address the low-income housing shortage.73 Congress mandated 
                                                          
(1) restricts or inhibits the prepayment of any mortgage described in 
section 4119(1) of this title . . . on eligible low income housing; (2) 
restricts or inhibits an owner of such housing from receiving the 
authorized annual return provided under section 4101 of this title; (3) is 
inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, including any law, 
regulation, or other restriction that limits or impairs the ability of any 
owner of eligible low income housing to receive incentives authorized 
under this subchapter . . . or (4) in its applicability to low income 
housing is limited only to eligible low income housing for which the 
owner has prepaid the mortgage or terminated the insurance 
contract . . . 
(b) Effect. This section shall not prevent the establishment, continuing 
in effect, or enforcement of any law or regulation of any State or 
political subdivision of a State not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this subchapter, such as any law or regulation relating to building 
standards, zoning limitations, health, safety, or habitability standards 
for housing, rent control, or conversion or rental housing to 
condominium or cooperative ownership, to the extent such law or 
regulation is of general applicability to both housing receiving Federal 
assistance and nonassisted housing . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
71 Id. 
72 H.R.CONF.REP. No. 101-943, at 458, 460 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6070, 6165 [hereinafter House LIHPRHA Report] (“Preemption: 
The [LIHPRHA] solution would recognize that a fair Federal preservation 
policy must apply uniformly to all affected properties regardless of location. For 
that reason, the solution would preempt State and Local laws that target only 
prepayment projects for special treatment.”). 
73 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 729. See Grow, supra note 9, at 3. While not 
endorsing HUD’s proposal, in 1996, Congress reduced funding for the 
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that, effective October 1, 1996, HUD suspend processing of any 
unapproved POAs under LIHPRHA.74 As a practical matter, 
LIHPRHA’s restrictive prepayment requirements have not been 
                                                          
LIHPRHA preservation program. Id. See Pub. L. No. 104-204 (FY 97 
Appropriations Act); see also H.R.Cong.Rep. No. 812, 104th Cong. (1996). 
The preservation program has been redesigned to reduce excessive 
costs. . . . To assist the Congress in making a determination of whether 
this program is the most cost-effective way to provide affordable 
housing opportunities to low-income families, the conferees request the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) to evaluate and review the program. 
Id., available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
 74 HOPE authorized the HUD secretary to limit LIHPRHA funding to 
certain developments meeting specified criteria and permitted prepayment so 
long as the owners held off on rent increases for sixty days. HOPE § 2(b). The 
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219, permanently defunded 
LIHPRHA and authorized prepayments notwithstanding its terms. Pub. L. No. 
105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998). 
Sec. 219. (a) Prepayment Right.—Notwithstanding prior acts: 
(1) the owner of the project may prepay, and the mortgagee may accept 
prepayment of, the mortgage on the project, and 
(2) the owner may request voluntary termination of a mortgage 
insurance contract with respect to such project and the contract may be 
terminated notwithstanding any requirements under sections 229 and 
250 of the National Housing Act. 
(b) Conditions.—Any prepayment of a mortgage or termination of an 
insurance contract authorized under subsection (a) may be made— 
(1) only to the extent that such prepayment or termination is consistent 
with the terms and conditions of the mortgage on or mortgage 
insurance contract for the project; 
(2) only if the owner of the project involved agrees not to increase the 
rent charges for any dwelling unit in the project during the 60-day 
period beginning upon such prepayment or termination; and 
(3) only if the owner of the project provides notice of intent to prepay 
or terminate, in such form as the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development may prescribe, to each tenant of the housing, the 
Secretary, and the chief executive officer of the appropriate State or 
local government for the jurisdiction within which the housing is 
located, not less than 150 days, but not more than 270 days, before such 
prepayment or termination. 
Id.  
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applied to any HUD-subsidized mortgage prepayments since 1996, 
although Congress has never explicitly repealed LIHPRHA. 
As part of its new housing policy, Congress passed the 
Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 (HOPE),75 
an appropriations bill that limited LIHPRHA funding and shifted 
resources to tenant-based subsidy programs, such as Section 8 
housing vouchers. Further, Section 219 of HOPE permitted 
prepayment of mortgages for subsidized projects without HUD 
approval, provided that owners delayed rent increases for at least 
sixty days.76 HOPE essentially reinstated most of the owners’ 
original rights to prepay Section 221(d)(3) and 236 mortgages, 
including the right to prepay their mortgages without HUD 
approval after twenty years.77 
Following the passage of HOPE, a series of congressional 
enactments, as part of the Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act, permanently defunded the Preservation Act’s 
incentive programs and authorized the prepayment of federally 
subsidized mortgages.78 Neither Section 219 nor any other 
provision in HOPE or the subsequent Acts contained a preemption 
clause such as that in LIHPRHA or references to LIHPRHA’s 
express preemption provision.79 Consequently, the interplay 
between LIHPRHA’s preemption provision and subsequent federal 
housing acts has been the subject of various preservation battles 
between low-income tenants and profit-motivated owners. Only 
two circuit courts have addressed the relationship between 
LIHPRHA and HOPE—the Eighth Circuit in Forest Park II v. 
Hadley and the Ninth Circuit in Topa Equities v. City of Los 
Angeles. Both courts have found that the LIHPRHA preemption 
provision is still applicable law, regardless of the provision under 
which an owner purports to be opting out. 
                                                          
75 HOPE § 2(b). 
76 Id. (“[O]nly if the owner of the project involved agrees not to increase 
the rent charges for any dwelling unit in the project during the 60-day period 
beginning upon such prepayment or termination. . . .”). 
77  Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219; see also Cienega 
Gardens, 38 Fed. Cl. at 70. 
78  Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219. 
79 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732. 
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Since the 1950s, HUD has subsidized approximately 1.7 
million rental units in more than 23,000 privately-owned 
properties.80 More than 80,000 low-income apartment units were 
preserved through LIHPRHA and the Emergency Act.81 However, 
between 1995 and 2003, following the enactment of HOPE and the 
return of the twenty-year prepayment option, more than 300,000 
units have been removed from the affordable housing stock.82 In 
2004, 1.4 million affordable units remained; more than forty 
percent of the tenants are elderly.83 Ever-increasing rents in most 
urban centers and the trend of owners opting-out of federal housing 
programs for larger profits have forced greater involvement by 
state and local governments in the provision of decent, affordable 
homes to American families.84 
                                                          
80 Hearing on H.R. 4679 Before the House Subcommittee on Housing and 
Community Opportunity, House Financial Services Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) 
(Testimony of Michael Bodaken, President, National Housing) (July 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter National Housing Trust Testimony], available at 
http://www.nhtinc.org/documents/072004_NHT_Testimony.pdf.  
81 SO. CAL. ASS’N OF GOV’T, THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PRESERVATION 
CRISIS: A RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL HUD-ASSISTED MULTIFAMILY 
HOUSING IN THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA REGION (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter RISK 
ASSESSMENT STUDY], available at http://api.ucla.edu/workshop/Housing 
Preservation/LinksResources/HousingPreservationReportFinal.htm.  
82 NAT’L HOUS. TRUST, CHANGES TO PROJECT-BASED MULTIFAMILY UNITS 
IN HUD’S INVENTORY BETWEEN 1995 AND 2003 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.nhtinc.org/documents/PB_Inventory.pdf. 
Analysis of HUD data finds that between 1995 and 2003, the number of 
such units dropped from 1.7 million to 1.4 million. The loss of 300,000 
affordable rental units is substantially larger than previous estimates. 
This loss is especially concerning in light of the shortage of other 
available affordable housing for extremely low-income households 
across the country. 
Id. 
83 National Housing Trust Testimony, supra note 80. 
84 On average, annual rent increases among American’s major metropolitan 
centers were three percent per year from 1988-1997. JACK GOODMAN, NAT’L 
MULTI HOUS. COUNCIL, PERFORMANCE ACROSS LOCAL APARTMENT MARKETS 
(1999), available at http://www.nmhc.org. See also KALIMA ROSE ET AL., PRATT 
INST. CTR. FOR CMTY. & ENV. DEVELOPMENT, INCREASING HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITY IN NEW YORK CITY: THE CASE FOR INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
(2004) (explaining that the average income for New York renter households 
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II. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PRESERVATION POLICIES 
Prior to the enactment of the Emergency Act and LIHPRHA, 
state and local governments provided limited protections for 
federal affordable housing projects. In the wake of LIHPRHA’s 
defunding, federal law no longer provides preservation guarantees; 
consequently, states and localities have assumed an even larger 
role in preserving affordable housing projects.85 Low-income 
housing advocates push for increased local government 
involvement in preservation because preservation, as compared to 
programs hinging on tenant vouchers, prevents the displacement of 
residents from their homes and communities, maintains affordable 
units for future tenants in need, and provides superior housing 
security for tenants and communities.86 In light of recent economic 
downturns, preservation also has proved more cost effective for 
local governments than the development of new affordable 
projects.87 Aggressive state and local preservation policies have 
achieved marked success in limiting the conversion of low-income 
housing to market-rate units.88 These protections come in a variety 
of forms, including procedural requirements for opting out, 
limitations on property owners’ returns, and the transfer of 
properties to preservation owners.89 
                                                          
grew just three percent from 1975 to 1999, but the average rent went up thirty-
three percent), available at http://www.policylink.org/ 
Research/NYIZ/default.html. 
85 Brian Galle, National Housing Law Project, Preserving Federally 
Assisted Housing at the State and Local Level: A Legislative Tool Kit, 29 HOUS. 
L. BULL. 183 (1999) (survey of state and local preservation initiatives), available 
at http://www.nhlp.org/html/hlb/1099/1099toolkit.htm. 
86 Grow, supra note 9, at 5. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-161(1999) 
(expressing that tenant-based Section 8 vouchers “do not always provide real 
rental choice for assisted families” noting that “in a number of cases, families 
with vouchers are unable to use their vouchers to obtain affordable housing”), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
87 Grow, supra note 9, at 5. 
88 See generally Risk Assessment Study, supra note 81. 
89 Galle, supra note 85. Numerous state and localities have also developed 
alternative programs aimed primarily at preserving projects through preservation 
incentives to current owners. Id. In exchange for new or extended agreements, 
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A. Procedural Requirements for Opting Out 
Procedural requirements provide information to tenants or local 
governments in order to prepare them for the impending removal 
of affordability restrictions on subsidized housing projects.90 
Current federal law guarantees no less than six months’ notice to 
HUD and tenants of an impending market-rate conversion.91 Many 
states have statutes requiring that notice be provided to tenants or 
local governments in advance of the current 150-day federal notice 
period.92 
                                                          
some of these programs provide: refinancing or cash-out current equity; equity 
takeout loans for other purposes; partial access to residual receipts or excess 
income accounts; and increased dividends. See also National Council of State 
Housing Agencies National Preservation Survey (1998), available at 
www.nhlp.org/html/pres/state/index.htm (citing programs in California, 
Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin). These state and local incentive-based 
preservation programs are beyond the scope of this note and are not likely in 
conflict with LIHPRHA preemption. Id. 
90 Galle, supra note 85, at 4. Notice requirements may additionally provide 
sufficient time for arranging a transfer of the project to a non-profit owner or 
deter some owners from prepaying. Id. 
91  Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act § 219 (requiring any 
owner who anticipates a termination of the Section 221(d)(3) or Section 236 
mortgage to provide no less than 150 days and no more than 270 days notice to 
tenants and to HUD); see also Galle, supra note 85. 
92 See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65863.10, et seq. (2001) (requiring, upon any 
action that would terminate subsidy for all HUD-subsidized housing, one year’s 
notice to tenants, state and local housing authorities, and local governments 
prior to termination or prepayment); 1988 Conn. Pub. Acts 88-262 (requiring 
one year notice); 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 60/3 (2004) (requiring, upon the 
intended sale or disposition of property for all HUD-subsidized housing, six 
months’ notice to tenants and to the state housing authority); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4973 (1993) (requiring ninety days notice to state and local 
housing authority triggered upon any action that would terminate subsidy for all 
HUD-subsidized housing); MD. CODE ANN., art. 83B, § 9-101, et seq. (1989) 
(requiring, upon intended sale or disposition of property for all HUD-subsidized 
housing, no less than one year or more than two years notice to locality, tenant 
association, state – notice is triggered by any action that may terminate subsidy); 
MINN. STAT. § 566.17 (1998) (requiring one year notice); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
45-4 et seq. (1988) (providing two years notice to tenant association, state, city; 
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For example, a Minnesota statute requires that a landlord who 
seeks to opt out of federally subsidized rental housing must 
provide tenants with one year’s written notice.93 A second 
Minnesota statute requires that, at least twelve months prior to 
termination, owners seeking to opt out or prepay their mortgage 
loans must submit to the state housing agency, local government, 
and affected residents a “tenant impact statement” outlining the 
potential impact of the termination on residents.94 These statutes 
were the subjects of a challenge by owners in Forest Park II v. 
Hadley, a case before the Eighth Circuit.95 
Under a similar California law, an owner of an assisted housing 
development who seeks to terminate a project-based contract must 
                                                          
and tenant access to information triggered upon sale, conversion, prepayment for 
all HUD-subsidized housing); TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 2306.185(f), et seq. 
(2005) (requiring one year’s notice to state housing authority triggered upon any 
action that would terminate subsidy for all HUD-subsidized housing); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 59.28 (2005) (requiring one year notice); DENVER, CO., MUN. 
CODE § 12-106, et seq. (2000) (requiring, triggered upon opt out or sale for all 
HUD-subsidized housing, one year’s notice to city, tenants for Section 8 
contract expirations; 210 days for long-term contract expirations; and 150 days 
for one year extensions); Portland, Or., City Code § 30.01.030, et seq. (2005) 
(requiring one year notice to city, tenants for § 8 contract expirations; 210 days 
for long-term contract expirations; and 150 days for 1 year extensions triggered 
upon opt out or sale for all HUD-subsidized housing); SAN FRANCISCO, CA., 
ADMIN. CODE § 60.4, et seq. (1990) (requiring, upon the intended sale or 
disposition of property Section 8 contracts, eighteen months’ notice to city and 
tenants for prepayment; twelve months’ notice for Section 8 contract 
expirations). 
93 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.255 (West 2002). 
The landlord of federally subsidized rental housing must give 
residential tenants of federally subsidized rental housing a one-year 
written notice under the following conditions: (1) a federal section 8 
contract will expire; (2) the landlord will exercise the option to 
terminate or not renew a federal section 8 contract and mortgage; (3) 
the landlord will prepay a mortgage and the prepayment will result in 
the termination of any federal use restrictions that apply to the housing; 
or (4) the landlord will terminate a housing subsidy program. 
Id. 
94 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.9997 (West 2001). See Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 
730. 
95 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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provide at least nine months’ notice of the proposed change to each 
affected tenant household in the assisted housing development.96 In 
addition, California law provides that an owner’s notice to tenants 
shall simultaneously be filed with a number of public entities, 
including the Board of Supervisors of the county, and the 
                                                          
96 Cal. Gov’t. Code § 65863.10(b) mandates that the notices contain 
specific information for the purpose of explaining to the tenants the process and 
ramifications of the owners’ decision to opt out. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 
65863.10(b). Cal Gov’t Code § 65863.10 provides: 
(b) At least nine months prior to the anticipated date of termination of a 
subsidy contract or prepayment on an assisted housing development, 
the owner proposing the termination or prepayment of governmental 
assistance shall provide a notice of the proposed change to each 
affected tenant household residing in the assisted housing development 
at the time the notice is provided. 
Id. § 65863.10. The amended Cal. Gov’t Code § 65863.10(b)(1) requires twelve 
months notice. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 65863.10(b)(1)-(6) provides: 
(1) The anticipated date of the termination or prepayment of the federal 
program, and the identity of the federal program . . . . 
(2) The current rent and anticipated new rent for the unit on the date of 
the prepayment or termination of the federal program . . . . 
(3) A statement that a copy of the notice will be sent to the city or 
county, or city and county, where the assisted development is located, 
to the appropriate local public housing authority, if any, and to the 
Department of Housing and Community Redevelopment. 
(4) A statement of the possibility that the housing may remain in the 
federal program after the proposed date of subsidy termination or 
prepayment if the owner elects to do so. 
(5) A statement of the owners’ intention to participate in any current 
replacement federal subsidy program made available to affected 
tenants. 
(6) The name and telephone number of the city, county, or city and 
county, the appropriate local public housing authority, if any, the 
Department of Housing and Community Development, and a legal 
services organization, that can be contacted to request additional 
written information about an owner’s responsibilities and the rights and 
options of an affected tenant. 
Id. § 65863.10(b)(1)-(6). 
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Department of Housing and Community Development.97 
B. Limiting Property Owners’ Returns 
The primary purpose of market-rate conversion is to increase 
an owner’s rents and profits. With this in mind, states and localities 
have also attempted to prevent owners from opting out through 
regulations that increase the costs of conversion.98 Governments 
have achieved this through either direct regulation of rent levels 
(i.e., rent control) or other requirements, such as so-called 
“statutory leases” or prepayment fees.99 
The Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (LARSO),100 
for example, prohibits owners of buildings previously subsidized 
by HUD from moving their rents to market level.101 LARSO 
                                                          
97 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65063.10(c)(1). These entities shall send additional 
notices containing supplemental information regarding the number of tenants 
affected, the number of units that are government assisted and the types of 
assistance they receive, the number of the units that are not government assisted, 
the number of bedrooms in each unit that is government assisted, and the ages 
and income of the affected tenants. Id. § 65863.10(c)(2). 
98 Galle, supra note 85, at 2. 
99 Id. at 3 (“Typically, [rent control] in the area involves setting the ‘base 
rent’ for any property exiting the federal subsidy or assistance program at the 
last rent level in effect under that program and then subsequently applying the 
generally applicable rent regulations on general and individual rent 
adjustments.”). See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CA. CODE § 37 (1998); LOS 
ANGELES, CA MUNICIPAL CODE § 151.02 (1995). Massachusetts has a similar 
statute that applies to all projects that terminated their government 
“involvement” in either insurance, interest subsidies, or rental assistance. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 14 (2001). 
 States and localities have enacted legislation imposing tenant relocation 
costs on owners who convert their affordable housing project to market-rate. See 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-11 (imposing moving costs); MD. ANN. CODE ART. 
83B § 9-105(a) (imposing moving costs up to $975); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.28 
(imposing relocation payment level of $2,000, half payable by the owner and 
half payable by the city). Seattle enacted a local relocation ordinance that 
applies to any displacement caused by demolition, change of use, substantial 
rehabilitation, or removal of use restrictions on federally assisted housing 
developments. SEATTLE, WA MUNICIPAL CODE §22.210 (enacted 1990). 
100 LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 151.01-04. (1995).  
101 Id. See also Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1067. This includes buildings 
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requires that, instead of entering the open market, properties 
exiting federal subsidy or assistance programs must enter the rent 
stabilization program at the rent previously charged when the 
buildings were under federal rent restrictions.102 The ordinance 
also provides that rents may not be adjusted “if a rental unit is 
vacated as a result of the termination of the regulation of the rental 
unit under any local, state, or federal program,” requiring the unit 
to remain available to low-income tenants even though vacancy 
decontrol would normally free the unit.103 This regulation was the 
subject of a challenge by owners in Topa Equities v. City of Los 
Angeles.104 
Another alternative involves so-called “statutory leases,” 
through which tenants in converted buildings receive mandatory 
temporary lease renewals under terms “specified by law at rent 
levels roughly equal to those in effect under the federal program” 
prior to conversion.105 Both Rhode Island and Maryland have 
statutes that employ this concept.106 
C. Transfer of Properties to Preservation Owners 
Recently, several states introduced and passed laws designed to 
permanently preserve at-risk properties by transferring ownership 
of the buildings to non-speculative or not-for-profit owners.107 
                                                          
that participated under Section 221(d)(3) and 236 programs. Id. 
102 Originally LARSO was Los Angeles’s general rent control regulation 
and applied only to standard, “free-market” rental units. Topa Equities, 342 F.3d 
at 1067. In 1990, Los Angeles amended LARSO to apply to properties that 
participate in federal programs under the NHA. Id. LARSO also contains a 
vacancy decontrol provision that permits owners to raise the rent for a unit to 
market level after the tenancy for that unit has terminated. Id. 
103 Id. 
104 342 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). 
105 Galle, supra note 85, at 3. 
106 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-11; MD. ANN. CODE ART 83B §§ 9-101–9-114; 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.30-A § 4976. 
107 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65863.10, et seq. (2001) (providing an offer to 
purchase to tenant associations, non-profit organizations, some for-profit 
organizations, and public agencies upon any action that would terminate the 
subsidy regarding all HUD-subsidized housing); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3805/8.1 
FREEDMAN MACROED CORRECTED 5-31-05.DOC 6/6/2005 1:26 PM 
 AFFORDABLE HOUSING PRESERVATION 767 
Many affordable housing advocates argue that such transfers are 
the best way to preserve at-risk housing because they are more 
likely to keep tenants in their homes and preserve properties as 
future housing sources.108 Generally, these laws provide non-
                                                          
(2004) (providing the tenant association with a true right of first refusal for all 
HUD-subsidized housing that is triggered upon the intended sale or disposition 
of property); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4973 (1993) (providing the state 
housing authority with a true right of first refusal that is triggered upon any 
action that would terminate the subsidy for all HUD-subsidized housing); MD. 
CODE ANN., art. 83B, § 9-101, et seq. (1989) (providing the local housing 
authority, groups representing tenants, and non-profit organizations with a true 
right of first refusal that is triggered upon the intended sale or disposition of 
property for all HUD-subsidized housing); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-45-4 et seq. 
(1988) (providing the tenant association, state housing authority, local housing 
authority, and locality with a true right of first refusal that is triggered for all 
HUD-subsidized housing upon sale, conversion, prepayment); TEX. GOV’T. 
CODE ANN. § 2306.185(f), et seq. (2005) (providing time for the state to locate a 
potential buyer, triggered upon any action that would terminate the subsidy for 
all HUD-subsidized housing); DENVER, CO., MUN. CODE § 12-106, et seq. 
(2000) (providing time for the city to negotiate for purchase, triggered upon opt 
out or sale for all HUD-subsidized housing); PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 
30.01.030, et seq. (2005) (providing time for the city to negotiate for purchase, 
triggered upon opt-out or sale for all HUD-subsidized housing); SAN 
FRANCISCO, CA., ADMIN. CODE § 60.4, et seq. (1990) (providing the city, tenant 
association, and non-profit organizations with a true right of first refusal 
triggered upon the intended sale or disposition of Section 8 properties). 
108 Galle, supra note 85, at 6. 
If cost were no object, permanent preservation of at-risk properties via 
transfer to non-speculative ownership would probably be the best way 
to preserve at-risk housing. Moving projects into the hands of entities 
whose purpose is providing housing rather than generating profit—such 
as tenant-endorsed or controlled non-profits— is more likely to keep 
tenants in their homes and preserve the property as a future housing 
resource. Obtaining both the necessary funds for transfer and site 
control from private owners remain difficult challenges in the ever-
changing policy and budget picture. In addition, local government 
activities that enable nonprofit purchasers to be competitive with other 
options available to owners interested in converting to market-rate use 
(e.g., identifying potential conversion candidates, contacting owners to 
explore transfer options, providing predevelopment support for 
purchasers) will continue to be especially important in preserving units. 
Id. 
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speculative or not-for-profit entities either a true “right of first 
refusal,” which permits a designated purchaser to match another 
sale offer and thereby acquire title, or a “right to make an offer,” 
with or without an obligation on the owner’s part to sell.109 
A California law requires that owners of affordable housing 
projects must, at least twelve months prior to prepayment, offer the 
property for sale to everyone on a state-maintained list of 
prospective purchasers who have indicated their willingness to 
assure the long-term affordability of the housing.110 For 180 days, 
these prospective purchasers have an exclusive right to make an 
offer. For an additional 180 days thereafter, all prospective buyers 
who made offers but were rejected still maintain a right of first 
refusal. This regulation was the subject of a challenge by owners in 
the Eastern District of California in Kenneth Arms v. Martinez,111 
which upheld the law in the face of a preemption challenge. The 
federal circuit courts have yet to rule on the validity of these laws 
                                                          
109 See, e.g., National Housing Law Program, Right of First Refusal in 
Preservation Properties: Worth a Second Look, 32 HOUS. L. BULL. 1 (Jan. 
2002); National Housing Law Program, Illinois Establishes Tenant Purchase 
Option for Properties Terminating Federal Programs, 34 HOUS. L. BULL. 150 
(July 2004) (discussing the Illinois law that provides an opportunity to purchase 
the property and preserve it as low-income housing before an owner converts it 
to market rent). In combination with mechanisms to obtain site control, some 
localities have adopted formula(s) specifying the sale price of preservation 
properties. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4973 (creating 
“preemptive options,” triggered by the act of prepayment or opt-out, that 
combine notice requirements with a right of first refusal for the state housing 
agency whenever the owner takes an action that would terminate a project’s 
subsidies); SAN FRANCISCO, CA ADMIN. CODE § 60.7(a) (setting a “Fair Return 
Price” based upon certain appraisal assumptions that the owner must accept as a 
sale price). 
110 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65863.11 (2001). Under Cal. Gov’t Code § 
65863.11(b)-(c), an owner may not sell or otherwise dispose of his development 
in a manner that would result in either discontinuance of the development’s 
status as an assisted housing development or the termination of any low-income 
use restrictions that apply to the development, unless the owner provides an 
opportunity to purchase the developments to specified public and private 
entities. Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *33 (citing CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 65863.11(b)-(c) (amended 2001)). 
111 Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *36. 
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in light of Section 4122 of LIHPRHA. Discussions regarding the 
effect of federal preemption on these regulations frequently arise, 
however, in state and city legislatures at hearings and debates 
about preservation policies.112 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR PREEMPTION 
Preemption is the power of the federal government to supplant 
state law with respect to matters the federal government has the 
power to regulate under the U.S. Constitution.113 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that congressional intent determines 
when a congressional act preempts state or local law.114 
Preemption of a state law by federal law may be either explicitly 
stated in the language of a federal statute, such as the LIHPRHA 
preemption provision, or read by the courts to be implicitly 
contained in the statute’s structure or purpose; that is, preemption 
may be express or implied.115 If a federal law expressly or 
                                                          
112 Grow, supra note 9, at 2; see also Galle, supra note 85, at 2; Chen, 
supra note 10. 
113 Preemption power is generally viewed as arising from the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Stabile, infra note 115, at 2, n.2; see, e.g., 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (noting “that state 
law conflicting with federal law is without effect”). 
114 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 
1992 (“The question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law 
is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone. To discern Congress’s intent we examine the explicit statutory 
language and the structure and purpose of the statute.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
115 Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for 
Congress of the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995); see also Jones v. Rath 
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la 
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982) (explaining how federal regulatory or 
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impliedly preempts a state law, then “the state law may not be used 
by a plaintiff to impose liability on a defendant.”116 There is a legal 
presumption against the preemption of state or local housing laws; 
however, Congress may preempt both explicitly.117 
Express preemption “occurs when a statute contains an explicit 
statement addressing the preemptive effect of the statute on state 
law claims, rather than leaving it to the courts to decide, in any 
given dispute, whether the federal statute preempts state law.”118 
Courts are usually called upon to interpret the precise scope of an 
express preemption provision, the application of which is clear, as 
Congress added the provision to the statute.119 Forest Park, Topa 
Equities, and their progeny are distinct in requiring the court to 
apply LIHPRHA’s preemption provision to HOPE, a distinct 
statutory program. The standard express preemption inquiry does 
not require this additional step because a preemption provision is 
generally part of the statute at issue.120 
In the absence of an express preemption provision, preemption 
may be implied.121 This implication may arise from a pervasive 
scheme of federal regulation, in which case federal law is said to 
“occupy the field.”122 Alternatively, implied preemption may arise 
                                                          
statutory law may expressly or impliedly preempt state law). 
116 Stabile, supra note 115, at 3. 
117 For discussion on the presumption against federal preemption of local 
police powers, see infra note 133 through 136 and accompanying text. 
118 Stabile, supra note 115, at 2. 
119 Id. 
120 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 1144(a), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter ERISA] 
(preempting all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans covered by 
ERISA); Hazardous Material Transportation Act, 29 U.S.C. app. 1811(a) 
(1988). 
121 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2003); Topa 
Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 
122 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) 
(concluding that the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act “occup[y] the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory 
program supervised by an expert administrative agency”); Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), rev’d sub nom. Rice v. Board of 
Trade of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247 (1947) (stating that federal regulatory scheme 
may be so pervasive or federal interest so dominant that enforcement of state 
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from a conflict between state law and federal law.123 Such a 
conflict can be actual, such as where it is impossible to satisfy both 
federal and state law simultaneously, or indirect, when a state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s 
objectives.124 
In both express and implied preemption contexts, congressional 
intent is “the ultimate touchstone” in determining the extent of 
federal preemption.125 Thus, in determining whether preemption is 
expressly addressed in a statute, “courts ask the question: did 
Congress intend its law to preempt a challenged state law?”126 
Since courts generally prefer to give effect to the plain and 
ordinary reading of statutory language, in express preemption 
situations, congressional intent is sought primarily in the language 
of the preemption provision.127 That is, where a statute contains an 
                                                          
laws on same subject is precluded). 
123 See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153. Preemption of 
state law where an actual conflict exists between a federal enactment and state 
law is compelled by the Supremacy Clause. For further discussion of the 
Supremacy Clause, see supra note 113. 
124 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (noting that state law is preempted where it 
is physically impossible to comply with both federal and state law); Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1961) (“A 
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry 
into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”). 
125 Stabile, supra note 115, at 7 (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at 96). 
126 Id. 
127 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. In using the plain meaning approach, it is 
assumed that the legislature probably used the words, grammar, and punctuation 
in a normal way to communicate its intent, so the words, grammar, and 
punctuation are to be given the meaning that they would ordinarily produce 
when trying to determine the legislature’s intent. The plain meaning statutory 
analysis begins with “the assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the] 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. 
Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). The plain meaning rule 
instructs a court to give the words of a statutory provision their “natural 
meaning,” unless doing so “would lead to a clearly unreasonable, absurd 
interpretation or there is otherwise clear evidence that Congress intended 
something other than the plain meaning of the statute.” Stabile, supra note 115, 
at 3, n.12 (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758-62 (1992) (noting that 
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express preemption provision, the issue of whether a state law is 
preempted is viewed as a question of statutory interpretation.128 
Prior to 1992, many courts engaged in implied preemption 
analysis after finding that a preemption provision did not invalidate 
state law.129 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,130 a case 
examining the preemptive scope of the Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969, the Supreme Court stated that there is no 
need to examine further the substantive provisions of legislation to 
infer congressional intent to preempt state law when Congress has 
included in the legislation a provision explicitly addressing 
preemption and when that provision provides a “reliable indicium 
                                                          
the opponent of the plain meaning bears an exceptionally heavy burden of 
persuasion in proving that Congress intended an alternative reading); Garcia v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (stating that only an extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions from the statute’s legislative history would 
justify a limitation on the unambiguous plain meaning of the statute’s language); 
see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (explaining that if 
the language in question has a plain and unambiguous meaning, then the court 
should not inquire further except in rare and exceptional cases). 
 The Supreme Court has used the plain meaning approach in interpreting 
various preemption provisions. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 
(1983) (“A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the 
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”) (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
504 U.S. 374, 383 (1988) (analogously applying Black’s Law Dictionary 
“relates to” definition to the interpretation of ADA); Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 
520-24 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97) (finding that the plain meaning of “no 
requirement or prohibition” sweeps broadly enough to encompass common-law 
obligations; thus the Court must give effect to the plain meaning unless there is 
clear congressional intent otherwise).  
128 Stabile, supra note 115, at 7. 
129 Id. at 57 n.209 (citing Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 
825-27 (11th Cir. 1989)) (holding that a common law tort action for failure to 
install airbags was not expressly preempted by the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, but was impliedly preempted by the provisions of Act), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420-
21 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that claims were impliedly preempted by the Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, but not expressly preempted)). 
130 505 U.S. 504 (1992). For a discussion on Cipollone, see Stabile, supra 
note 115, at 59. 
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of congressional intent with respect to state authority.”131 The 
Court reasoned that Congress’s enactment of an express 
preemption provision implies that matters beyond the reach of that 
provision are not preempted.132 
There is a presumption against federal preemption of laws 
concerning “spheres traditionally occupied by the states.”133 
Housing regulations, land use restrictions, and zoning ordinances 
are within the traditional spheres of state and local police 
powers.134 Historically, preemption of a state or local law is not 
                                                          
131 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. 
132 Id. 
133 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“States traditionally 
have had great latitude under the police powers to legislate as to the protection 
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”); N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 655 (1995) (citing and quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (noting that the 
exercise by a local authority of its historic police power is not to be superseded 
by federal statutes unless this was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) 
(explaining that preemption is not appropriate in areas in which states 
traditionally have enjoyed broad power to regulate). 
134 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (noting that 
property is bought and sold and investments are made subject to the State’s 
power to regulate); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (holding that 
the Takings Clause, while conferring substantial protection on property owners, 
does not eliminate the police power of the State to enact limitations on the use of 
their property); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). 
The government’s power to forbid particular land uses in order to 
advance some legitimate police-power purpose includes the power to 
condition such use upon some concession by the owner, even a 
concession of property rights, so long as the condition furthers the same 
governmental purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting the use. 
Id. See also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 
361 (1986). 
[P]olice power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-
use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order 
to promote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation 
or physical invasion of property. From the property owner’s point of 
view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or 
whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the 
effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it. 
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lightly presumed, and courts exercise great restraint when spheres 
traditionally occupied by the states are the subjects of a preemption 
challenge.135 Therefore, even with express preemption, it is 
difficult to argue that a federal law was intended to broadly 
supplant the power of state or local governments with regard to 
housing or land use issues.136 
IV. FOREST PARK AND TOPA EQUITIES 
In Forest Park137 and Topa Equities,138 the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits, respectively, held that the LIHPRHA preemption 
provision applies to housing projects opting out of federal 
programs under HOPE.139 The courts reached opposite conclusions 
regarding federal preemption of the state preservation laws at issue 
because of the diverging preemption tests each court embraced.140 
                                                          
Id. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26 (1954) (noting that land use regulation is within the inherent police 
powers of the States and their political subdivisions). 
135 For a discussion on the presumption against preemption, see supra note 
133. See also Chester v. Panicucci, 281 A.2d 811 (1971) (explaining that federal 
preemption of local police powers must be explicit). 
136 See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 860 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). Principles of 
federalism dictate that in the absence of a clear intent to supersede the historic 
police powers of the States, Congress cannot be deemed to have significantly 
changed the federal-state balance. Franklin Tower, 157 N.J. at 615; see also N.Y. 
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 654. Because 
the party claiming preemption bears the heavy burden of supporting that claim 
by “clear and manifest evidence,” the starting point for any preemption analysis 
dealing with housing issues is that Congress does not generally intend to 
supplant state law. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 
514 U.S. at 654. 
137 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003). 
138 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
139 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732. 
140 Compare Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732 (holding that the Minnesota 
preservation statutes at issue are expressly and impliedly preempted by the 
applicable federal statutes) with Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070 (holding that 
the Los Angeles preservation ordinance at issue is not expressly or impliedly 
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In Topa Equities, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the 
Eighth Circuit’s holding in Forest Park on the grounds that the 
preservation laws were fundamentally different.141 However, at 
least one federal court has observed that the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding concerning the applicable scope of the LIHPRHA 
preemption provision conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s practical 
effects test.142 
 
A. Applying the Preservation Act’s Preemption Provision to 
HOPE’s Alternative Prepayment Schedule: The Plain 
Reading 
In Forest Park II v. Hadley, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a 
tenant’s association’s attempt to delay the prepayment of a Section 
236 mortgage by the owner of a low-income housing 
development.143 The Minnesota statutes at issue require that an 
owner provide one year’s notice in advance of prepayment, while 
current federal law under HOPE requires notice of no less than 150 
days.144 The owner complied with federal requirements, but failed 
to comply with the state notice requirement.145 The district court 
found that since the building owner was opting out of the federal 
affordable housing program under HOPE’s prepayment provisions, 
LIHPRHA did not apply.146 The district court granted the tenant’s 
                                                          
preempted by the applicable federal statutes). Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; 
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 724. 
141 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069. 
142 Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 704 (Fed. Cl. 
2004). 
143 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 727. 
144 Id. at 729-30. 
145 Id. at 727. 
146 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 203 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D. Minn. 
2002). 
As indicated by the language of Section 4122, the statute only preempts 
state law that is “inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter”; in 
other words LIHPRHA. 12 U.S.C. § 4122(b) (2005). Section 4122 
therefore has no applicability to state laws that may conflict with the 
notice provisions enacted apart from LIHPRHA. In this case, Forest 
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association injunctive relief until the owner complied with both 
state and federal law.147 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit observed that, “unlike cases 
involving a field traditionally regulated by the states, there [was] 
no presumption against preemption in this case” because the case 
did not involve a field traditionally regulated by the states.148 The 
court determined that the central issue was not whether the statutes 
involved a field subject to the state’s traditional police power, but 
rather, whether Minnesota law was restricting HUD from 
administering the “entity it regulates”—the HUD-subsidized 
project.149 The court rejected traditional preemption analysis, in 
which congressional intent controls, because, under the Supremacy 
Clause,150 “state statutes may not interfere with the implementation 
of a federal program by a federal agency.”151 Therefore, the court 
regarded congressional intent and legislative history as irrelevant 
because in the regulatory realm at issue, federal law reigned 
supreme.152 The court effectively short-circuited the preemption 
analysis by determining that the issue was settled by the state 
statute’s frustration of a federal administrative agency’s acts. 
 Unlike the district court below, the Eighth Circuit was not 
                                                          
Park II asserts that the relevant state laws conflict with Section 219 of 
the 1999 HUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105-276, § 
219(b)(3)(1999). 
Id. at 1075. 
147 Id. 
148 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)) (“The 
relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently 
federal in character because the relationship originates from, is governed by, and 
terminates according to federal law.”). 
149 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 731-32. 
150 See Supremacy Clause, supra note 113. 
151 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 731-32 (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at 96) (noting 
that in traditional preemption analysis, the “ultimate touchstone” is 
congressional intent, but that the unique federal laws and programs involved in 
the case make it difficult to apply a traditional preemption analysis). The court 
also noted that there was no presumption against preemption in this case. Id. 
(citing Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347). 
152 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732. 
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persuaded by the tenants’ argument that LIHPRHA was implicitly 
repealed because Congress ceased funding its incentive programs. 
The circuit court found that LIHPRHA had not been explicitly 
repealed, and it was still applicable because the loans at issue were 
described in the eligibility provision.153 The LIHPRHA preemption 
provision, according to the court, therefore remains enforceable 
against state or local laws that “restrict or inhibit” prepayment.154 
Under this rationale, federal law, not state law, provides the 
appropriate notice requirements. 
The Ninth Circuit heard similar arguments in the case of Topa 
Equities v. City of Los Angeles,155 in which an owner of an 
apartment building challenged a Los Angeles ordinance 
prohibiting owners of low-income housing who had previously 
opted-out of federal housing programs from raising rents until 
existing low-income tenancies had terminated.156 The building 
owner had prepaid his Section 236 mortgage in hopes of raising 
rents to market levels and claimed that Section 4122 preempted the 
city ordinance.157 The city argued, and the district court agreed, 
that HOPE impliedly repealed the LIHPRHA preemption clause, 
given that the Act’s new opt-out requirements post-dated the 
defunding of LIHPRHA.158 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and 
concurred with the Eighth Circuit’s holding that LIHPRHA’s 
                                                          
153 Id. at 733. 
Congress used very broad language in defining the types of mortgages 
covered by the preemption provision. To the extent that it intended 
preemption to apply only to laws affecting mortgages subject to 
LIHPRHA, it could have stated as much. The fact that Congress no 
longer funds the incentive programs established by LIHPRHA does not 
mean that the prepayment provisions contained therein are irrelevant or 
that the statute is no longer the law. 
Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
156 Id. at 1070. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
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preemption provision applies to HOPE’s prepayment schedule.159 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit determined that LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision was still effective, despite the termination of 
funding for LIHPRHA-based programs.160 The court concluded 
that congressional inaction had no effect on LIHPRHA’s express 
preemption provision.161 Thus, the court expressly joined the 
Eighth Circuit in limiting the inquiry to the unrepealed language of 
the dormant LIHPRHA program.162 
B. Determining the Scope of the Preservation Act’s Preemption 
Provision 
In Forest Park, the Eighth Circuit determined that Congress 
intended for Section 4122 to be applied broadly.163 The court 
supported its holding by citing the broadness of the “restrict or 
inhibit” language of LIHPRHA’s preemption provision. Further, 
the court emphasized that Congress had originally intended to offer 
prepayment as an incentive for owners to participate in the HUD 
program.164 According to the court, the broad language used in 
defining the types of mortgages covered by the preemption 
provision implied that the provision’s application was not limited 
to mortgages subject to a POA for LIHPRHA prepayment.165 The 
court therefore interpreted the Preservation Act’s preemption 
provision to apply to projects opting out under alternative 
                                                          
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1069 (citing and quoting Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 
203 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“The intention of the legislature to repeal 
must be clear and manifest, and in the absence of some affirmative showing of 
an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by 
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.”). 
161 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069 (“While it is true that Congress has, 
since enacting HOPE, ceased funding LIHPRHA’s incentive programs, that 
inaction has no effect on LIHPRHA’s express preemption provision. That 
provision is extant.”). 
162 Id. 
163 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732-34. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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prepayment processes, such as HOPE.166 
In order to determine whether the Minnesota statutes “restrict 
or inhibit” the prepayment of mortgages, the court examined the 
“practical effect” of the state restrictions.167 The court recognized 
that the statutes did not, on their face, directly “restrict or inhibit” 
the prepayment of mortgages.168 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that the effect of the state statutes was to “restrict or 
inhibit” prepayment of federal mortgages since an owner could be 
in compliance with the federal notice requirement when prepaying 
the mortgage, but would still need to wait to prepay in order to 
comply with the state’s notice requirements.169 The court explained 
that because compliance with state regulations is required, “the 
statutes have the direct effect of impeding, burdening, and 
inhibiting the prepayment of federal mortgages even if the 
additional requirements may be minimal.”170 
Moreover, the court found that the federal laws regarding 
prepayment “impliedly preempt the [Minnesota] statutes because 
the state statutes conflict with federal law.”171 Under the practical 
effects test, any statute that diminishes the realization of federally 
                                                          
166 Id. at 729. 
167 Id. at 733. 
168 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733. 
169 Id. The court stated: 
The effect is that the state law forces the federal government to 
continue to provide financial assistance to the participant when both the 
federal government and the participant have chosen to end their 
relationship. In this way, the state law not only regulates the conduct of 
the citizen-owner, requiring him to take additional actions in order to 
withdraw, but also regulates or restricts the actions of the federal 
government under its own federal program. 
Id. 
170 Id. The court described the state statute as an additional requirement 
“that forces owners to remain in a federally subsidized program from which 
Congress has authorized withdrawal.” Id. at 733-34. The court further explained 
that “[s]ince the Minnesota law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of [HUD’s] full purposes and objectives as defined by Congress, it 
must give way.” Id. 
171 Id. at 733. 
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granted expectations is preempted by Section 4122.172 
The Ninth Circuit in Topa Equities v. City of Los Angeles173 
determined that the preemption provision should be narrowly 
applied, thereby implicitly rejecting the “practical effects” 
approach endorsed by the Eighth Circuit.174 The Ninth Circuit 
articulated a different test—the “legal consequences” approach—
for determining whether the state statute at issue was preempted by 
LIHPRHA.175 
Under the legal consequences test, the court found that the Los 
Angeles rent stabilization law was not preempted as applied to a 
building opting out of a Section 236 HUD-subsidized mortgage.176 
The Ninth Circuit examined whether LARSO directly prohibited or 
limited the ability of federal housing project owners to prepay their 
mortgages by imposing some legal bar or impediment to their 
doing so. Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Forest Park, the Topa 
Equities court did not address whether LARSO made prepayment 
impracticable as an economic matter.177 
In reviewing the case, the court noted that there was a 
presumption against preemption stemming from the historical 
understanding of housing and land use issues as part of the states’ 
police powers.178 The court cited paragraph (b) of the LIHPRHA 
                                                          
172 Id. 
173 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1071 (quoting from Kargman v. Sullivan, 
552 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1977)). The court in Kargman addressed whether a local 
rent control ordinance was preempted by HUD regulations. The First Circuit 
concluded that the ordinance was not preempted because it operated 
independently from the federal subsidized housing program. Kargman, 552 F.2d 
at 6. A different result was reached by the First Circuit in City of Boston v. 
Harris, 619 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1980), in which the Court of Appeals held that 
Boston’s rent control ordinance directly conflicted with HUD regulations and 
was accordingly preempted. The Court in Topa Equities looked to whether the 
city’s “traditionally strong interest in local rent control must yield.” Topa 
Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070. 
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preemption provision, which preserves certain state or local laws, 
and commented that “nothing in the HUD regulations purports to 
limit states from enacting their own rent control laws of general 
applicability which apply equally to apartment owners who exit the 
federal program as well as other apartment owners.”179 
Additionally, the court cited a First Circuit decision that held that 
“federal legislation creating the network of subsidized housing 
laws is superimposed upon and consciously interdependent from 
the substructure of local law relating to housing.”180 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the local ordinance at issue 
was not preempted by Section 4122 because it did not “restrict or 
prohibit” an owner’s prepayment options.181 Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit held that subsection (b) of Section 4122 insulated the city 
ordinance from challenge because the ordinance applied across the 
board, preventing all owners of low-income housing from 
increasing rents, regardless of whether an had owner prepaid or 
opted out of federal housing programs.182 The court distinguished 
the Eighth Circuit’s findings in Forest Park by holding that the 
Los Angeles ordinance, unlike the Minnesota statutes, restricted 
rental increases in all apartment buildings, regardless of an owner’s 
past or present participation in federal housing programs.183 
The Eighth Circuit in Forest Park184 and Ninth Circuit in Topa 
                                                          
179 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1072. 
180 Id. (citing to Kargman, 552 F.2d at 1). 
181 Id. at 1067. 
182 Id. at 1070. 
183 Id. (finding that the Minnesota law prohibited prepayment of federal 
programs if the participant did not provide a longer period of notice than the 
federal notice required upon opting out of the federal program; therefore, while 
the Los Angeles ordinance affected all low-income housing owners, regardless 
of participation in federal low-income housing programs, the Minnesota statute 
was specifically limited to those owners who sought to prepay federal-
subsidized mortgages) (citing Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470) 
(finding state statutes that required owners seeking to prepay federally 
subsidized mortgages to comply with state regulations that required longer 
notice than federal law and provided tenants with first refusal rights were not 
preempted by the preemption language contained in LIHPRHA). 
184 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 724. 
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Equities185 are the only circuit courts to have ruled on whether the 
LIHPRHA preemption provision applies to housing projects opting 
out under alternative federal statutes.186 The courts’ decisions to 
apply the preemption provision in such cases were based on a plain 
and ordinary reading of the statute. While the cases are 
distinguishable based on the types of statutes or regulations 
involved (a procedural requirement to opting out as compared to a 
regulation limiting property owners’ returns upon opting out), they 
appear to conflict regarding the applicable scope of LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision.187 
V. ANALYSIS 
The holdings of Forest Park188 and Topa Equities189 have 
significant implications for the low- and very-low income tenants 
residing in the remaining 1.4 million rental units in more than 
23,000 privately owned, HUD-subsidized properties.190 These 
holdings restrict the ability of state and local governments to 
address distinctly local housing issues in the face of the federal 
government’s progressive burdening of state and local 
governments with responsibility for administering federal 
programs to house the poor.191 In their attempts to address 
affordable housing shortages, several states and localities have 
enacted preservation laws that work to maintain the quickly 
diminishing permanent stock of affordable housing.192 Despite the 
                                                          
185 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1065. 
186 Id. at 1069; Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732. 
187 Independence Park Apts. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 692, 704 (Fed. 
Cl., 2004). Compare Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732 (holding that the Minnesota 
preservation statutes are expressly and impliedly preempted by the applicable 
federal statutes) with Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1070 (holding that the Los 
Angeles preservation ordinance is not expressly or impliedly preempted by the 
applicable federal statutes). 
188 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2003). 
189 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
190 National Housing Trust Testimony, supra note 80. 
191 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 1069; Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 724. 
192 For discussion on state and local preservation policies, see supra Part 
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agreement of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits regarding the first issue 
in the preemption analysis—whether LIHPRHA’s preemption 
provision applies to HOPE’s prepayment provisions—courts 
should continue to review this issue, particularly in light of the 
ambiguous and incongruous results of the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuit’s plain reading interpretation of an implied relationship 
between LIHPRHA and HOPE. 
With regard to the circuit split on the second issue—the 
applicable scope of federal preemption—the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning is more consistent with past preemption jurisprudence. 
First, housing regulations, land use restrictions, and zoning 
ordinances are within the zone of state police powers.193 In light of 
the presumption against preemption of laws and regulations 
enacted in accordance with a state’s police powers, the provision 
must be construed narrowly.194 Second, LIHPRHA’s legislative 
history illustrates congressional intent not to limit the ability of 
state and local governments to regulate privately owned, 
subsidized affordable housing projects after opt out.195 The courts’ 
interpretations of these issues determine whether owners are 
permitted to opt out without complying with the state procedures 
intended to preserve affordable housing. 
A. In Search of Congressional Intent 
Although the Eighth and Ninth Circuits ruled on the issue of 
whether the LIHPRHA preemption provision applies to projects 
opting out of federal affordability restrictions under HOPE, this 
remains an open question. State courts and federal courts in other 
circuits are not bound by the decisions of these circuits; indeed, a 
state court in the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion 
subsequent to Ninth Circuit’s decision in Topa Equities.196 The 
                                                          
III. 
193 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
194 Cipollone v. Liggett Groups, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
195 See infra notes 256 through 260 and accompanying text. 
196 College Gardens Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, No. 03 
AS02608, slip op., at 3 (Sac. Superior Court, Cal. Nov. 19, 2003) (ruling that 
California’s law requiring notice to tenants in prepaying rental projects was not 
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debate over whether to apply the LIHPRHA preemption provision 
to HOPE is shaped by differing methods of statutory interpretation: 
the circuit courts have applied a plain meaning approach, while 
affordable housing advocates have sought to direct the courts’ 
attention to the statutory purpose and congressional history of 
LIHPRHA.197 The standard for determining the effect of the 
LIHPRHA preemption provision is congressional intent; therefore, 
the method of statutory interpretation applied by the courts dictates 
the scope of the examination.198 
The plain meaning approach used by the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits gives effect to the clear, ordinary language of the Acts.199 
The LIHPRHA preemption provision, by its terms, applies to any 
laws or regulations that restrict prepayments of “eligible low-
income housing.”200 In 1990, when Congress enacted LIHPRHA, 
buildings in all federal housing programs were LIHPRHA eligible 
and regulated by HUD.201 The Eighth Circuit determined that 
                                                          
preempted by the long-dormant LIHPRHA when the owners were not seeking to 
prepay under LIHPRHA), available at http://www.ruralhome.org/manager/ 
uploads/college.pdf. 
197 Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 729 (“Appellees argue that [the preemption] 
provision is not applicable to Forest Park’s Section 236 mortgage because of 
Congress’s subsequent actions.”); see generally Topa Equities, 342 F.3d at 
1070. 
198 Ultimately, rules of statutory interpretation attempt to determine the 
“intent of the legislature.” 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.5 
(6th ed.). Differing theories of statutory interpretation are in essence means of 
giving a particular law the meaning intended by Congress. For a discussion on 
the plain meaning method of statutory interpretation, see supra note 127. 
199 Id. 
200 H.R. Rep. No. 101-559, at 78 (1990) [hereinafter House Comm. Report]. 
[Section] 4122 would preempt and declare null and void any state or 
local law, ordinance or regulation that limits an owner’s right to pay off 
a mortgage on eligible low- income housing or, limits the occupancy, 
type of tenure, use or rental charges of such a property. The committee 
wishes to emphasize that the pre-emption provision only applies to 
eligible housing, defined in the bill as projects with mortgages that are 
insured or assigned under Section 221 (d)(3)(BMIR) or Section 236 
program. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
201 Id. 
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Minnesota laws mandating additional procedural requirements for 
projects attempting to opt out of federal affordable housing 
programs infringed upon HUD’s administrative mandate to 
regulate federal housing policies and programs.202 The court 
concluded that legislative history was irrelevant because the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the states 
from interfering with the implementation of a federal program by a 
federal agency.203 The court therefore held that the Minnesota laws 
were preempted based on a plain reading of HUD’s federal 
prerogatives and the state law’s impact on housing under federal 
programs. 
Through its cursory analysis, the Eighth Circuit bypassed the 
opportunity to examine other evidence of congressional intent, 
including relevant legislative history and HUD’s own policies, 
which do not support the application of the LIHPRHA preemption 
provision to projects opting out through HOPE.204 The Ninth 
Circuit expressly adopted the Eighth Circuit’s holding without 
significant discussion. The court appeared content with the plain 
reading conclusion that because LIHPRHA had not been explicitly 
repealed, the preemption provision continued to apply to HUD-
regulated housing projects and programs. 
The circuit courts’ plain meaning interpretation of LIHPRHA 
leads to ambiguous and incongruous results. As such, the circuit 
courts should have considered other means of interpretation.205 In 
effect, the courts have applied the terms of LIHPRHA to HOPE, a 
                                                          
202 See supra notes 148 through 153 and accompanying text. 
203 Id. 
204 This analysis would lead to the examination of HUD policies regarding 
the application of Section 4122 to projects opting out through HOPE. As 
mentioned above, the Court mentioned HUD’s policies, but did not consider 
them to govern the decision. Id. This analysis appears inconsistent. Choosing to 
free HUD from state regulations that it does not deem restrictive would appear 
beyond what the court was called upon to do. 
205 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743 (2004) “If, after application of 
these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the statute is 
ambiguous, we may turn to legislative history. For the language to be considered 
ambiguous, however, it must be susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation or more than one accepted meaning.” Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
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separate statute, absent statutory language or congressional records 
explicitly addressing the relationship between the statutes.206 The 
plain meaning approach is not appropriate when the court is 
examining two separate federal statutory programs. 
Nonetheless, the courts held that because LIHPRHA’s terms 
incorporate all buildings opting out of federal affordability 
programs today, these buildings also benefit from the Act’s 
preemption provision. LIHPRHA provided HUD with guidance for 
regulating all federal housing programs; therefore, all buildings 
built before 1990 were LIHPRHA eligible.207 Congress, however, 
subsequently ordered HUD to suspend further processing of 
preservation applications that did not have approved action plans, 
thereby rendering LIHPRHA dormant.208 Although LIHPRHA was 
never expressly repealed, as evidenced by the fact that buildings 
participating in preservation programs continue to receive funding 
pursuant to agreements executed while the program was still 
accepting new applications, technically no buildings remain 
prospectively LIHPRHA eligible.209 For this reason, the courts’ 
                                                          
206 See supra note 78 through 80 and accompanying text. 
207 12 U.S.C. § 4119(1) (2005). 
§ 4119(1) The term “eligible low-income housing” means any housing 
financed by a loan or mortgage— (A) that is (i) insured or held by the 
Secretary under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act [12 
USCS § 1715l(d)(3)] and receiving loan management assistance under 
section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 [42 USCS § 1437f] 
due to a conversion from section 101 of the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1965; (ii) insured or held by the Secretary and 
bears interest at a rate determined under the proviso of section 
221(d)(5) of the National Housing Act [12 USCS § 1715l(d)(5)]; (iii) 
insured, assisted, or held by the Secretary or a State or State agency 
under section 236 of the National Housing Act [12 USCS § 1715z-1]; 
or (iv) held by the Secretary and formerly insured under a program 
referred to in clause (i), (ii), or (iii); and (B) that, under regulation or 
contract in effect before February 5, 1988, is or will within 24 months 
become eligible for prepayment without prior approval of the 
Secretary. 
Id. 
208 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
209 See Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *13. HUD’s 
inability to accept new preservation applications, execute new POAs or enforce 
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application of the LIHPRHA preemption provision to buildings 
opting out under HOPE is inappropriate, as there is no active 
program for which the buildings may be deemed eligible. Since 
1996, HUD has lacked the authority to accept new LIHPRHA 
applications.210 It is illogical to suggest that, at LIHPRHA’s 
creation, Congress intended that LIHPRHA should apply to 
properties that had never participated in LIHPRHA because, in 
1990, Congress had no reason to address non-participating 
properties, which did not exist as a class until Congress ceased 
funding mandatory LIHPRHA preservation in 1996. HUD’s own 
policy before these cases was consistent with this approach.211 
As the Supreme Court held in Cipollone, “[w]here Congress 
explicitly preempts state law, Congress’s enactment of a provision 
defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters 
beyond that reach are not preempted.”212 As non-LIHPRHA 
properties are not referenced in LIHPRHA’s express preemption 
provision, such properties are beyond its reach. If the LIHPRHA 
preemption provision were applied to non-LIHPRHA properties, it 
is reasonable to assume that all LIHPRHA prepayment provisions 
should apply as well. This includes requiring owners to issue a 
LIHPRHA notice of intent and to submit and receive HUD 
approval of a POA.213 It is counterintuitive to suggest that one 
provision of LIHPRHA applies to owners when owners are not 
required to meet any of the statute’s other prepayment 
                                                          
LIHPRHA’s provisions except as to owners already participating in LIHPRHA 
prior to October 1, 1996 as sufficient reasoning for the holding that since “[t]he 
Owners were never involved in the LIHPRHA Preservation Program, and never 
operated under the LIHPRHA plan of action. Rather, the prepayment scheme 
followed by the Owners is that embodied in [Section 219], permitting mortgage 
prepayment without HUD approval, rather than LIHPRHA with its restrictions.” 
Id. The court held that the preemption provision of LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 
4122, does not govern and thus does not preempt the California notice and right 
of first refusal statutes. Id. 
210 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
211  Letter from Clare Harringan, Office of HUD General Counsel, to Judge 
Lawrence K. Karlton, June 21, 2001 [hereinafter HUD Letter] (on file with 
author). 
212 Cipollone v. Liggett Groups, Inc. 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). 
213 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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requirements. Indeed, if the buildings that were the subjects of 
review by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits were LIHPRHA eligible, 
without explicit congressional language on point, LIHPRHA 
would dictate that the owners of these buildings would be required 
to submit findings of minimal tenant impact as a condition of 
receiving HUD authorization to opt out.214 To argue, as the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits did, that a project is entitled to the benefits of 
LIHPRHA (express preemption), but need not shoulder its burdens 
(for example, detailed assurances that low-income tenants will not 
be harmed) turns a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent 
on its head. Indeed, as a slip opinion by a California Superior 
Court referencing the holdings of both Forest Park and Topa 
Equities recently noted, “Although LIHPRHA continues to apply 
to properties participating prior to 1996, in effect the heart of 
LIHPRHA has been eviscerated.”215 A cursory analysis of these 
results seem incongruous or at the least unfair, thus requiring 
further examination of the legislative history and purpose of both 
statutes.216 
                                                          
214 Id. 
215 College Gardens Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, slip op., at 
3. 
216 This is similar to holdings in various circuit courts in cases dealing with 
the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 1201). While out of the 
preemption context, it does provide a workable solution about when and how to 
read congressional history and legislative purpose when dealing with absurd 
results of a plain meaning interpretation. The following circuit courts held 
against the plain language of the ADA, which states that an employer is required 
to accommodate an individual who is “regarded as” disabled. See Kaplan v. City 
of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir. 2003). 
On the face of the ADA, failure to provide reasonable accommodation 
to “an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” constitutes 
discrimination. And, on its face, the ADA’s definition of “qualified 
individual with a disability” does not differentiate between the three 
alternative prongs of the “disability” definition. The absence of a stated 
distinction, however, is not tantamount to an explicit instruction by 
Congress that “regarded as” individuals are entitled to reasonable 
accommodations. Moreover, because a formalistic reading of the ADA 
in this context has been considered by some courts to lead to bizarre 
results, we must look beyond the literal language of the ADA. 
Id. at 1232 (citing Royal Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 
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The ambiguity created by a plain meaning approach to 
interpreting the LIHPRHA preemption provision suggests that 
courts should apply a clearer and more thorough interpretative 
framework to the analysis of this provision by looking to statutory 
purpose and legislative history to determine whether to apply the 
LIHPRHA preemption provision to HOPE’s prepayment 
provisions. The lack of congressional funding for LIHPRHA 
should give rise to an analysis of available congressional history 
and legislative purpose, which would serve to highlight the error of 
applying the preemption provision to properties opting out under 
HOPE. LIHPRHA’s legislative purpose and congressional intent in 
this area dictate that the LIHPRHA preemption provision should 
not be applied to HOPE’s provisions.217 This analysis has been 
supported by a formal opinion of HUD, which, in lieu of relevant 
congressional language, should be granted deference. 
1. Analyzing the Legislative Purpose of LIHPRHA 
Congressional hearings on LIHPRHA suggest that LIHPRHA 
preemption is only applicable to LIHPRHA-eligible properties.218 
Furthermore, there is no preemption language contained in HOPE, 
the National Housing Act of 1934, the Emergency Low Income 
Housing Preservation Act of 1987, or the regulation promulgated 
by HUD that grants owners the right to prepay their mortgages.219 
Through LIHPRHA, Congress demonstrated its understanding that 
                                                          
1108 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal citations omitted) (recognizing that a court must 
look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would 
lead to an absurd result). See also Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 
(8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 217 These arguments are expanded versions of arguments presented to the 
Sacramento, California Superior Court on behalf of the plaintiff, College 
Gardens Preservation Committee, in the case of College Gardens Preservation 
Committee v. Eugene Burger. See Letter Brief on the Applicability of LIHPRHA, 
College Gardens Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, No. 03 AS02608 
(Sac. Superior Court, Cal. Nov. 19, 2003) (on file with author).  
218 See House Comm. Report, supra note 200. 
219 For a discussion on the relationship between various federal housing 
statutes, see supra Part II. 
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it was free to add a preemption provision when it deemed one 
necessary. Congress determined that a preemption provision was 
required in LIHPRHA because the Act added substantial burdens 
and cumbersome regulations to subsidized properties.220 
Prior to its defunding, LIHPRHA was a comprehensive federal 
preservation program that substantially restricted prepayments of 
“eligible low-income housing.”221 Only a few properties could 
satisfy LIHPRHA’s restrictive criteria for prepayment and 
conversion to market-rate housing.222 In fact, the LIHPRHA 
program functioned primarily to provide federally funded 
incentives to preserve eligible properties.223 Preemption was an 
integral part of the comprehensive LIHPRHA statutory scheme. 
The purpose of Section 4122’s preemption provision was to 
prevent states and localities from singling out LIHPRHA 
participants for special and disadvantageous treatment that would 
reduce the federal preservation incentives otherwise available 
under the program.224 
The congressional record, in providing for express preemption 
of prepayment restrictions, demonstrates that Congress was 
concerned with equitable treatment of private affordable housing 
projects throughout the states and had no intention of abrogating 
state procedural requirements as they applied to non-participating 
properties.225 Restrictions by individual states would have proven 
unnecessary and have created non-uniform procedures nationwide. 
Further, investors seeking to develop federally subsidized 
properties would have been able to choose where to develop based 
not on need, but rather, on the number and form of state opt-out 
provisions. Because the federal government abandoned project-
subsidized programs in 1996 when it reinstituted owners’ 
prepayment rights, it is reasonable to assume that the federalism 
interests that were of concern at the time of LIHPRHA’s enactment 
                                                          
220 See House LIHPRHA Report, supra note 72; College Gardens 
Preservation Committee v. Eugene Burger, slip op., at 3. 
221 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
222 See Winkelman, supra note 66. 
223 Id. 
224 See House LIHPRHA Report, supra note 72. 
225 Id. 
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are no longer relevant. As such, courts should not second-guess 
Congress’s decision not to add a preemption provision to HOPE.226 
2. Reviewing HUD’s Interpretation of the LIHPRHA Preemption 
Provision’s Applicability to Non-LIHPRHA Properties 
Upon the enactment of LIHPRHA, Congress charged HUD 
with administering the LIHPRHA program.227 In exercising this 
mandate, HUD determined that the LIHPRHA preemption 
provision does not apply to non-LIHPRHA properties.228 In the 
agency’s opinion letter addressing this issue and related federal 
preemption questions concerning California’s prepayment notice 
statutes,229 HUD’s General Counsel explained that because 
Congress ceased funding for new LIHPRHA action plans in 1996, 
LIHPRHA presently applies only to those projects that received 
LIHPRHA preservation incentives prior to 1996.230 Therefore, 
state laws can be inconsistent with LIHPRHA only with respect to 
projects that have already received preservation incentives and 
                                                          
226 United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (1982). 
227 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4101. (“General prepayment limitation (a) 
Prepayment and termination. An owner of eligible low-income housing may 
prepay, and a mortgagee may accept prepayment of, a mortgage on such housing 
only in accordance with a plan of action approved by the [HUD] 
Secretary. . . .”). 
228 HUD Letter, supra note 211. 
229 Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470 (holding that the 
LIHPRHA preemption provision does not apply to four non-LIHPRHA 
apartment developments). 
230 HUD Letter, supra note 211. 
The preemption provision in LIHPRHA at Section 232, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 
4122, was intended to afford protection to owners of properties that 
were, or are, operating under the LIHPRHA Preservation Program 
(emphasis added). Section 4122(b) states that the section “shall not 
prevent the establishment, continuing in effect, or enforcement of any 
law or regulation of any State or political subdivision of a State not 
inconsistent with the provision of this subchapter.” Thus, a state law 
could not be inconsistent with the provision of LIHPRHA for an owner 
who was never involved in the LIHPRHA Preservation Program and 
never operated under a LIHPRHA plan of action. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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undertaken additional affordability restrictions.231 The HUD Letter 
further stated that the express language of the LIHPRHA 
preemption provision limits preemption to local laws that are 
inconsistent with LIHPRHA.232 In addition to relying on the 
limiting language of the LIHPRHA preemption provision, HUD 
further reasoned that because “HUD does not have authority to 
accept new preservation applications or to enter into new plans of 
action, it has continued to implement and enforce the provisions of 
LIHPRHA only as to those owners who were in the program prior 
to the passage of HOPE [the successor statutory scheme] in 
1996.”233 
In United States v. Mead,234 the Supreme Court held that an 
agency’s “permissible construction of [a] statute” that it is charged 
with administering is entitled to “some deference,” even if the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is not rendered within a 
public notice and comment rulemaking framework.235 Indeed, as 
explained in Skidmore v. Swift,236 such agency interpretations are 
“entitled to respect” to the extent they have the “power to 
persuade.”237 Further, in Auer v. Robbins238 the Supreme Court 
held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is 
controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”239 Like the agency interpretation at issue in Auer, 
which was submitted in an amicus brief, HUD’s interpretation 
regarding preemption in the Kenneth Arms case was submitted by 
                                                          
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233  HUD Letter, supra note 211. 
234 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (finding that Customs letter “classification 
ruling may at least seek a respect proportional to its power to persuade, and may 
claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit with 
prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight”). 
235 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
236 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
237 Id. 
238 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
239 Id. 
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letter brief at the court’s invitation.240 The agency’s interpretation 
was not at issue in Kenneth Arms. Thus, like the agency 
interpretation in Auer, “[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that 
the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment on the matter in question.”241 
For the foregoing reasons, future courts hearing preemption 
challenges should question the continued application of 
LIHPRHA’s preemption provision to owners opting out under 
Section 219 of HOPE or other similar prepayment provisions. 
B. Future Preemption Analysis and the Ninth Circuit’s 
Approach 
If courts continue to apply LIHPRHA’s preemption provision 
to owners opting out under HOPE, courts should follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s narrow “legal consequences” analysis.242 This approach is 
                                                          
240 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (2002) (citing 
HUD Letter Brief in Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *33). 
241 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. The Eighth Circuit in Forest Park, in a footnote, 
cast aside Supreme Court precedent and found that the Court owes no deference 
to the letter cited in Kenneth Arms. Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733, n.6. The 
Court distinguished the letter at issue from an official agency interpretation 
resulting from official agency rulemaking procedures. Id. The Court cited the 
Supreme Court case of Christensen v. Harris County, in which the Supreme 
court found that a Department of Labor opinion letter taking the position that an 
employer may compel the use of compensatory time only if the employee has 
agreed in advance to such a practice was not due deference for the application of 
a clear and unambiguous statute. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 
587 (2000). 
 In Christensen, however, the Supreme Court also found that “[a]n agency’s 
opinion letter interpreting its own regulation is entitled to deference when 
language of regulation is ambiguous.” Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588. The only 
thing that is clear regarding LIHPRHA, its provisions, Congress’s refusal to 
continue funding LIHPRHA programs, Congress’s enactment of an alternative, 
and currently only prepayment option through budget Appropriation, is that the 
application of HOPE and LIHPRHA is ambiguous. For a discussion on the 
ambiguities created through a plain reading interpretation of the relationship 
between LIHPRHA and HOPE, see supra Part V. 
242 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
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consistent with established preemption jurisprudence and 
congressional intent. The Eighth Circuit’s expansive “practical 
effects” approach erroneously applies administrative law principles 
to a preemption analysis and is inconsistent with congressional 
intent.243 
As past preemption cases dictate, there is a presumption against 
preemption within traditional spheres of local police powers, 
unless it can be shown that it is the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress to preempt state authority.244 Housing regulations, land 
use restrictions, and zoning ordinances fall within the traditional 
spheres of state and local police powers.245 While the Supremacy 
Clause does not require a narrow or broad construction in response 
to the presumption against preemption,246 the Supreme Court, in 
Cipollone, recently held that the preemption provision at issue 
required a narrow interpretation.247 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding and its doctrine of preempting 
regulations that have the practical effect of restricting or inhibiting 
the prepayment of HUD-subsidized mortgages is inconsistent with 
the presumption against preemption. Furthermore, absent any 
guidance, the application of this approach may impede the ability 
of state and local governments to preserve affordable housing 
within the existing framework of the federal prepayment 
scheme.248 A modest application of this holding would in effect 
                                                          
243 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2003), reh’g and 
reh’g en banc denied (2003). 
244 See discussion supra Part III and accompanying notes. 
245 Id. 
246 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
247 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. 
248 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 734. The Eighth Circuit may have attempted 
to limit this expansive interpretation of LIHPRHA’s preemptive scope, but its 
language fell short of such a goal. 
[N]ot . . . all state attempts at preserving existing federally subsidized, 
low-income housing are preempted. Nothing in the federal statutes, 
their legislative history, or their stated objectives indicates that states 
are prohibited from instituting their own incentive plans or other 
programs to preserve low-income housing within the framework of the 
federal prepayment scheme. When, however, these state programs 
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preempt all state and local preservation laws that inhibit the 
realization of expectations by owners opting out or prepaying 
Section 221(d)(3) or 236 mortgages.249 This language includes 
limitations on the property owners’ returns and forced transfers of 
properties to preservation owners, in addition to the procedural 
requirements involved in the case.250 As the court succinctly stated, 
a “further requirement imposed by a state statute would directly 
interfere with Congress’s original intent of offering prepayment as 
an incentive.”251 Therefore, even though the Eighth Circuit found 
that the Minnesota notice requirements do not explicitly bar 
prepayment, it nonetheless found that they had the effect of 
restricting opt out and were consequently preempted.252 
The Ninth Circuit held that LIHPRHA’s structure supports the 
proposition that the “restrict or inhibit” language of Section 4122 
was not intended to preempt state preservation laws that do not 
explicitly place barriers on the prepayment of Section 221(d)(3) 
and 236 mortgages.253 The court found that LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision requires a narrow construction and expressly 
states that local laws are preempted “only to the extent that [they] 
violate the provisions of this subsection.” 254 Further, the statute 
limits preemption to local laws “inconsistent” with LIHPRHA.255 
Congressional history suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
is more in line with what Congress intended and that Congress in 
                                                          
place additional requirements on federal program participants, restrict 
the exercise of the participants’ federally granted prepayment rights, or 
create delays in the prepayment process, they are preempted. 
Id. 
249 Id. at 732 (noting that the effect of the state statute was to limit a right to 
move to the market rates that Congress provided). 
250 For discussion on various preservation laws and regulations, see supra 
Part III. 
251 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 733. Nonetheless, the law that provided the 
incentive is not the law that provided the preemption provision—an 
inconsistency the court failed to address. Id. 
252 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d at 732. 
253 Topa Equities, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
254 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4122. 
255 Id. 
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fact considered state preservation laws and did not intend to 
preempt such laws.256 Statements from various House committees 
illustrate that Congress intended LIHPRHA to work in conjunction 
with state preservation laws; indeed, a House conference 
committee specifically cited to a Maryland preservation law.257 
The Maryland law noted by the conference committee was adopted 
in 1989, the year before Congress enacted LIHPRHA.258 This state 
law requires owners to provide notice to the local government and 
to tenants at least one year before prepayment, which is more 
comprehensive than the notice required by the Minnesota impact 
statement law at issue in Forest Park.259 If the congressional 
committee did not intend to preempt the Maryland law, then it 
follows that Congress did not intend to preempt the Minnesota or 
California laws, which were less far reaching.260 
Further, LIHPRHA’s reporting requirements demonstrate that 
Congress understood state and local efforts as a means of ensuring 
                                                          
256 Congressman Hoagland, sponsoring the amendment that became section 
4122(b), described it as “narrowing the State and local law preemption language 
in the bill so that the state and local laws that contradict this statute will be 
preempted.” 136 CONG. REC. H6053-01, H6183 (daily ed. July 31, 1990). See 
also S. REP. NO. 316, 101 Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 106 (June 8, 1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5763, 5868 (“Local task forces have also considered the 
range of municipal responses (rent control, tax abatement, etc.) that can be taken 
alone or in conjunction with a federal preservation solution . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
257 See H.R.CONF.REP. 101-943, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6070, 
6171. (“In the event of prepayment, HUD would have several tools to protect 
the existing tenants and assist the affected community in replacing the stock. 
The tenant protections build upon provisions contained in the House bill as well 
as in State laws such as the Maryland Assisted Housing Preservation Act.”). 
258 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9, §§ 101-114 (2003); see statutes cited 
supra notes 93-94. 
259 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9-103(a)(1)-(5) (2005); see statutes cited 
supra notes 93-94. 
260 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9, §§ 101-114 (2003); see statutes cited 
supra notes 93-94. See also Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 
272, 287-88 (1987) (finding “significant” the fact that Congress was aware of 
and acknowledged in debates existing similar state laws when enacting federal 
law and “failed to evince the requisite ‘clear and manifest’ purpose to supersede 
them”). 
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an effective flow of information regarding prepayment and viewed 
such local efforts as complementary to LIHPRHA. Throughout 
LIHPRHA are requirements that the owner and HUD notify both 
tenants and state or local government entities of all activities 
leading up to prepayment.261 LIHPRHA thus encourages state and 
local entities to use this information to assist tenants in preserving 
affordable housing.262 These provisions evince Congress’s desire 
to empower tenants and state and local governments to effect the 
preservation purposes of the Act. In a 1999 Hearing Notice 
provided to all affordable housing projects, HUD clearly supported 
                                                          
261 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4102(b) (2005). In relevant part, the statute 
provides: 
The owner, upon filing a notice of intent under this section, shall 
simultaneously file the notice of intent with the chief executive officer 
of the appropriate State or local government for the jurisdiction within 
which the housing is located and with the mortgagee, and shall inform 
the tenants of the housing of the filing. 
Id. § 4106(c). “The Secretary shall make any information provided to the owner 
under subsections (a) and (b) of this section available to the tenants of the 
housing together with other information relating to the rights and opportunities 
of the tenants.” Id. § 4107(a)(2). 
Each owner submitting a plan of action under this section to the 
Secretary shall also submit a copy to the tenants of the housing. The 
owner shall simultaneously submit the plan of action to the office of the 
chief executive officer of the appropriate State or local government for 
the jurisdiction within which the housing is located. 
Id. § 4118: 
The Secretary shall confer with any appropriate State or local 
government agency to confirm any State or local assistance that is 
available to achieve the purposes of this title and shall give 
consideration to the views of any such agency when agency when 
making determinations under this subchapter. The Secretary shall also 
confer with appropriate interested parties that the Secretary believes 
could assist in the development of a plan of action that best achieves 
the purposes of this subchapter. 
Id. 
262 LIHPRHA, 12 U.S.C. § 4107(a)(2) (“An appropriate agency of such 
State of local government shall review the plan and advise the tenants of the 
housing of any programs that are available to assist the tenants in carrying out 
the purposes of this title.”). 
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this position, explaining that “besides meeting the Federal 
notification requirement, project Owners must also comply with 
any State or local notification requirements.”263 
There is a distinct legal difference between imposing a barrier 
to prepayment and imposing rent control on formerly subsidized 
buildings.264 Speculative owners may argue that differentiating 
between the two destroys the intent of the preemption provision 
because applying rent control post-opt out, from an owner’s 
perspective, compels the same result as a prepayment barrier.265 By 
opting out of a federal program, however, an owner changes the 
essence of the particular building. For example, the owner is no 
longer required to comply with certain federally mandated property 
standards, the owner is no longer liable under certain federal laws, 
and the tax structure of the investment is changed.266 The 
legislative history of LIHPRHA suggests that, while Congress 
intended to provide property owners with an opportunity to free 
themselves from the increased oversight and potential liability 
associated with participation in a federal housing program, it did 
not intend to permit owners to free themselves from the historic 
police powers of states and localities to regulate housing and land 
use issues. 
Therefore, LIHPRHA’s structure, notice requirement, and 
legislative history do not demonstrate the clear and manifest 
congressional intent required for Section 4122 to preempt state 
notice laws.267 Conversely, they suggest congressional approval of 
supplementary state preservation efforts, such as the Maryland 
                                                          
263 Kenneth Arms, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11470, at *10 (citing HUD 
Housing Notice 99-36, Dec. 29, 1999). 
264 Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2003), reh’g and 
reh’g en banc denied (2003). See also Lifgren v. Yeutter, 767 F. Supp. 1473 (D. 
Minn. 1991) (holding that the Preservation Act and regulations relating thereto 
are not inconsistent with the borrower’s option to prepay at any time, but rather, 
the Preservation Act and its regulations simply provide procedures that must be 
followed in the event that a borrower evidences an intent to prepay). 
265 Forest Park, 336 F.3d at 732. 
266 Winkelman, supra note 38, at 1160. 
267 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
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preservation statute.268 
VI. RECOMMENDATION: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
SHOULD LOOK TO TRANSFER PROPERTIES TO PRESERVATION 
OWNERS 
Preservation of affordable housing is an economical and 
efficient means of safeguarding housing for current and future low-
income residents.269 As the federal government continues to 
abandon affordable housing programs, state and local governments 
must look to preservation laws to maintain affordable housing or 
face waves of homeless or displaced low-income tenants.270 
Preservation policies offer security to current tenants facing 
drastically increasing rents in units that have benefited from 
subsidized rents for the past twenty years. Laws that encourage and 
provide methods of transferring federally subsidized affordable 
housing projects to non-speculative owners, such as the Illinois 
Assisted Housing Preservation Act and the New York Tenant 
Empowerment Act (Intro. No. 186), provide an optimal means of 
preserving at-risk housing.271 The transfer of projects to tenant-
endorsed or tenant-controlled non-profit organizations, whose 
purpose is to provide housing, not generate profit, will keep tenants 
in their homes and preserve properties as future housing sources.272 
                                                          
268 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9-103(a)(1)-(5) (2005); see statutes cited 
supra note 93-94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, tit. 9, §§ 101-114 (2003). 
269 Grow, supra note 9, at 3. Given current funding concerns, the 
development of new affordable housing units appears unlikely. Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Rather than providing notice of impending opt-out, these laws provide 
long-term security to the tenants and their communities. Grow, supra note 9, at 
3. 
272 Galle, supra note 85, at 5. Obtaining both the necessary funds for 
transfer and site control from private owners remains a difficult challenge for 
state and local governments. Id. Some 150 states or localities have adopted 
housing trust funds providing revenue to assist the preservation of affordable 
homes. Id. Obtaining sufficient capital funds will usually require state or local 
financial contributions, which may include formerly “federal” funds such as 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, HOME Investment Partnership Program or 
Community Development Block Grant funds. Id. Low-Income Housing Tax 
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Legal and practical issues regarding these laws are untested, but 
following the preemption analysis set forth in the cases regarding 
other preservation laws, these laws should not be subject to federal 
preemption because they do not “restrict or inhibit” prepayment, as 
they apply after opt out.273 Illinois’s statute and the proposed New 
                                                          
Credit (LIHTC) is an indirect method of subsidizing low-income housing. See 
132 Cong. Rec. S8146-8158 (daily ed. June 23, 1986) (explaining the legislative 
intent of the LIHTC). See also DAYE, supra note 3, at 247-49. HOME 
Investment Partnerships Program, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 
Home Investment Partnerships Program (2004), at http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/index.cfm. For a discussion on 
the HOME Investment Partnership Act of 1990, see DAYE, supra note 3, at 240-
42. For a discussion on Community Development Block Grant program 
(CDBG), see supra note 7. 
 Some states have dedicated some general revenues to maintaining 
affordability in HUD-subsidized housing. Galle, supra note 85, at 6 (“For 
example, in California the enacted budget for FY 2000 includes $6 million for a 
broad purpose multifamily acquisition and rehabilitation program, with the first 
priority for funding being the preservation of currently affordable units.”). On 
the local level, San Francisco, for example, established the San Francisco 
Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) to administer several million dollars of 
redevelopment agency tax increment funds for a variety of uses, including grants 
and below-market loans for nonprofit purchasers, pre-development assistance, 
and tenant outreach, organizing, and technical assistance. Galle, supra note 85, 
at 6. More information regarding SFRA available at http://www.sfgov.org/ 
site/sfra_index.asp. 
 Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and tax-exempt bond allocations 
may provide an important source of funds for nonprofit acquisitions. Galle, 
supra note 85, at 6 (“California reserves 10 percent of its Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credits for preservation. For several years in Massachusetts . . . 60 percent 
of the state’s credits are allocated to large-scale projects with significant federal 
resources.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See generally Ammann, 
supra note 8. Both state and municipal governments provide other capital or 
debt subsidy measures. Galle, supra note 85, at 7 n.36, 37 (“Many state housing 
finance agencies, including those in Maine, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and 
Vermont, use their own budgets for low- or no-interest loans to promote 
preservation purchases. These funds are used for costs of purchase, to 
rehabilitate properties, to expand affordability, [and] to cover predevelopment 
costs. . . . ”). 
273 Grow, supra note 9, at 6; Galle, supra note 85, at 6; See Franzese, supra 
note 10. 
 A constitutional taking issue exists with the application of these 
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York City housing regulations are good examples of laws that 
work to provide increased protections for current tenants.274 
                                                          
preservation laws. Grow, supra note 9, at 6. Although there have so far been no 
such challenges to state or local purchase opportunity laws, the takings issue 
appears fairly straightforward so long as just compensation in provided. Grow, 
supra note 9, at 6 (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (“The Fifth 
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking 
without just compensation.”)). The federal Constitution prohibits takings for 
public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. . . .”) Id. 
 Federal, state, and local regulatory action can result in a constitutional 
taking of private property so long as it is for a valid public use and just 
compensation is provided. Grow, supra note 9, at 6. So long as preservation 
purchase opportunity laws are not mandatory or provide market value 
compensation by setting transfer prices at appraised market value, they appear to 
fall safely outside of the takings clause. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001)) (“When a taking has occurred, under accepted 
condemnation principles the owner’s damages will be based upon the property’s 
fair market value . . . an inquiry which will turn, in part, on restrictions on use 
imposed by legitimate zoning or other regulatory limitations.”). 
 A constitutional takings challenge to LIHPRHA was examined along these 
lines. In Chancellor Manor v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that since 
the Owners of federally subsidized affordable housing projects should have 
known that HUD’s regulations regarding prepayment could be changed at any 
time, and that their right to prepay their mortgages was not a property interest 
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. Chancellor Manor v. United 
States, 331 F.3d 891, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court remanded the case for a 
more thorough factual inquiry in order to determine whether the plaintiffs could 
“establish the existence of a regulatory taking under the Penn Central 
standards.” Id. at 906. The court directed the lower court to address all Penn 
Central factors including: (1) the extent to which HUD’s regulatory change 
interfered with the Owners’ objective reasonable expectations; (2) the economic 
impact of HUD’s regulatory change on the Owners; and (3) the nature of HUD’s 
regulatory change. Id. at 906. 
274 New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004 (“A Local Law to amend the 
administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to creating a right of 
first refusal and an opportunity to purchase.”). See Chen, supra note 10. These 
laws still create the challenge for purchasers and public agencies to find or 
provide the necessary funds. For a discussion on funding options, see Galle, 
supra note 85. Ideas for such funding in New York include the creation of a 
Housing Trust Fund, similar to the Federal Housing Trust Fund discussed. See 
Chen, supra note 9. 
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Additionally, these laws are good illustrations of why state and 
local governments should feel secure in the face of a preemption 
challenge. 
Transfer laws seek to reinstitute a key “component of the 
federal preservation policy for HUD-subsidized properties that the 
federal government [has] abandoned since 1995—that preservation 
is of sufficient importance to warrant restrictions on owner 
conversion, so long as those restrictions are supported with market-
value compensation.”275 Both the Illinois law and the New York 
City regulation cover all properties with HUD-subsidized 
mortgages when the owners threaten conversion, sale, or 
disposition of properties.276 Both statutes create purchase rights 
when an owner proposes to sell a property or terminate the existing 
federal subsidy programs or restrictions.277 These rights provide 
tenant associations or their designees the right to purchase, 
recognizing that tenant associations are not always in the best 
position to purchase.278 A valuation of the properties in question is 
performed through multiple appraisals, and a specified resolution 
procedure is available if an agreement on the property’s value 
cannot be reached.279 Thus, these laws relieve the government of 
                                                          
275 See Grow, supra note 9, at 6. This principle still governs the federal 
Rural Housing Services-subsidized multifamily inventory. 42. U.S.C. § 1742(c) 
et. seq. (2004). 
276 Illinois law now covers properties with HUD-subsidized mortgages, 
properties with certain state-provided mortgages, properties with expiring or 
terminative project-based Section 8 contracts, and properties with expiring rent 
restrictions under the federally funded but state-administered Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit program. 310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/3 (as amended, July 
2004). Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, Chap. 9, §26-801 
et. seq. 
277 310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/5 (2004) (as amended by SB 2329, enacted 
July 2004); Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, §§ 26-805, 
807. 
278 310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/5 (2004) (as amended by SB 2329, enacted 
July 2004); Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, §§ 26-805, 
807. 
279 310 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/7(b) (2004) (as amended by SB 2329, enacted 
July 2004); Proposed New York City Council Int. No. 186-2004, § 26-804 
(Appraisal Determination). 
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the burden of maintaining housing projects, but encourage and 
provide means for stabilizing losses of affordable housing units. 
These preservation laws can survive a LIHPRHA preemption 
challenge because they apply to buildings “following opt-out” of 
federal housing programs.280 Notwithstanding anti-preemption 
arguments, current tenants should look for ways to preserve current 
affordable housing under the assumption that courts will continue 
to apply the preemption provision. The Eighth Circuit’s expansive 
doctrine is problematic, as a practical effect of forced transfer laws 
may be to limit conversions.281 These transfer laws may limit the 
ability of owners to realize speculative gains since the goal of such 
preservation laws is to encourage owners to sell their properties to 
preservation owners. However, nowhere does the language or 
legislative history of LIHPRHA support the position that Congress 
intended to displace all state and local power on housing and land 
use issues.282 Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, these laws will 
not be preempted, as they do not expressly “restrict or inhibit” 
prepayment.283 State and localities are currently using procedural 
requirements in conjunction with other forms of preservation laws; 
however, in order to comply with possible federal preemption 
issues, it may be wise to limit this practice and repeal current 
procedural requirements.284 Even under the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis, procedural requirements may be interpreted as placing a 
barrier to prepayment.285 
The ironic conclusion is that preservation laws that limit 
property owners’ returns on opting out (i.e., rent control) and aid or 
force the transfer to preservation owners (under eminent domain 
power) are more controversial than procedural requirements.286 
                                                          
280 See Franzese, supra note 10. 
281 The practical effects test preempts laws that have the effect of restricting 
owners from realizing profits from moving their building’s units to market rates. 
Forest Park II, 336 F.3d 724. According to the Eighth Circuit, this would be an 
attempt to circumvent the “restrict or inhibit” language of Section 4122. Id. 
282 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d 1065. 
283 Id. 
284 Forest Park II, 336 F.3d 724. 
285 For further discussion, see supra Part V.B. 
286 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
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This is one of the more absurd results of express preemption 
provisions and the reason many scholars have called for the 
cessation of congressional use of preemption provisions.287 
Nonetheless, preservation laws that apply post-opt out will have 
significant advantages in overcoming LIHPRHA preemption issues 
and helping to provide “a decent home and suitable living 
environment for every American family.”288 
CONCLUSION 
The preservation of project-based affordable housing is a vital 
part of any housing program for low- and very-low-income 
individuals. In the recent past, the federal government has 
maintained preservation requirements in order to continue to 
provide housing for America’s poorest residents. In the mid-1990s, 
Congress, at the whim of changing national priorities, determined 
that funds should be redirected toward the goal of balancing the 
national budget.289 Congress subsequently enacted HOPE and 
discontinued federal preservation requirements.290 
State and local governments both before and after these federal 
efforts have used preservation policies to provide homes for low- 
and very-low income tenants. As witnessed throughout the nation, 
these policies continue to provide security to those fearing 
impending notice of a drastic increase to market-rate rents. 
Congress, in drafting LIHPRHA, recognized the crucial role of 
states and localities in providing affordable housing. In LIHPRHA, 
Congress provided that state and local preservation laws should not 
be superseded by the Act. Nonetheless, because the burdens 
imposed by LIHPRHA were heavy, Congress restricted the ability 
of states and localities to place further burdens on properties with a 
LIHPRHA “plan of action” by enacting the LIHPRHA preemption 
                                                          
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); see also Jordan Rose, Eminent 
Domain Abuse: The Growing Threat to Private Property, 174 ARIZ. ISSUE 
ANALYSIS, Aug. 16, 2002. 
287 See generally Stabile, supra note 115. 
288 National Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441.  
289 See supra note 73 through 74 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra note 75 through 77 and accompanying text. 
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provision. 
Legislative history dictates that Congress intended for 
LIHPRHA’s benefits, including its preemption provision, to be 
extended to those properties accepting the burdens of LIHPRHA. 
Therefore, buildings opting out under alternative prepayment 
schemes, such as HOPE, were not intended be the beneficial 
recipients of LIHPRHA incentives, including Section 4122. The 
buildings at issue in Forest Park291 and Topa Equities292 opted out 
of Section 236 affordability restrictions through HOPE’s 
prepayment provisions, and therefore, should not have been 
afforded the benefit of LIHPRHA preemption. The analysis of both 
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits overlooked a basic manifestation of 
congressional intent as determined through rules of statutory 
construction endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
In the event that courts continue to apply LIHPRHA’s 
preemption provision to affordable housing properties opting out 
under alternative prepayment schemes, they should apply the Ninth 
Circuit’s narrow approach. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and 
analysis accord with established preemption jurisprudence and are 
more aligned with congressional intent, as determined through 
LIHPRHA’s structure and legislative history. The Eighth Circuit’s 
expansive “practical effects” approach erroneously applies 
administrative law principles to a preemption analysis and is not in 
line with explicit congressional intent. These divergent 
interpretations possess the potential to further reduce the 
availability of housing to the detriment of elderly and low-income 
tenants. Even though the federal government has given up on these 
tenants, the federal courts should not inhibit local governments 
from working for their benefit. 
 
                                                          
291 Forest Park, 336 F.3d 724. 
292 Topa Equities, 342 F.3d 1065. 
